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President George W. Bush's September 20, 2001 televised primetime address to a Joint 
Session of Congress stands in history as his Administration's first deliberate official rhetorical 
response to the  events of 9/11 and the first instance of the "Bush Doctrine." Although 9/11 has 
become an increasing topic of scholarly review and this speech is the first presidential policy 
response, few have explored Bush's choice of metaphors in this speech. Metaphors are a 
powerful tool of rhetoric, especially in political rhetoric, because metaphors are uniquely adept at 
simplifying complex topics, and a study of metaphor can reveal a speaker's underlying 
worldview and beliefs. Through metaphorical analysis, this study identifies nine clusters of 
metaphor in Bush's September 20, 2001 address: FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, 
NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE. This study contrasts 
metaphor clusters to "prophetic dualism," a worldview that defines foreign policy within the 
context of a specific set of moral beliefs, and concludes that the artifact meets all tenets of 
prophetic dualism as well as the core characteristics of presidential crisis rhetoric and civil 
religion (although the artifact does not meet all characteristics of presidential war rhetoric). The 
study closes with a discussion of practical, rhetorical and methodological implications that may 
be useful to scholars of rhetoric and political science, including suggestions for future research of 






Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ vi 
Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
Immediate Reactions to 9/11 ...................................................................................................... 2 
Patriotism and Nationalism ..................................................................................................... 4 
The PATRIOT Act and Other Federal Responses .................................................................. 7 
Leading During Crisis: President George W. Bush .................................................................. 10 
Bush's Post-9/11 Rhetorical Transformation ........................................................................ 11 
First Complete Rhetorical Response: September 20, 2001 Address .................................... 13 
Rhetorical Intentions of the September 20, 2001 Address ................................................... 14 
Prophetic Dualism and Metaphor ......................................................................................... 15 
Research Questions ................................................................................................................... 16 
Preview of Chapters .................................................................................................................. 17 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review....................................................................................................... 19 
The Rhetorical Presidency ........................................................................................................ 19 
Presidential Crisis Rhetoric ...................................................................................................... 25 
Presidential War Rhetoric ......................................................................................................... 29 
Civil Religion in Presidential Rhetoric ..................................................................................... 34 
Prophetic Dualism ..................................................................................................................... 37 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 40 
Chapter 3 - Methodology .............................................................................................................. 42 
Metaphoric Criticism ................................................................................................................ 42 
Metaphor in War Rhetoric and Civil Religion ...................................................................... 49 
Metaphor in Prophetic Dualism ............................................................................................ 49 
Method of Study: Metaphorical Concepts ................................................................................ 50 
Artifact ...................................................................................................................................... 52 
Chapter 4 - Analysis...................................................................................................................... 53 
FORCE/WAR ....................................................................................................................... 54 
BODY ................................................................................................................................... 57 
v 
 
FEAR .................................................................................................................................... 57 
LIGHT/DARK ...................................................................................................................... 58 
NEAR/FAR ........................................................................................................................... 59 
UNITY .................................................................................................................................. 60 
FAITH/FATE ........................................................................................................................ 61 
GOOD/EVIL ......................................................................................................................... 62 
SAVAGE .............................................................................................................................. 64 
Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Discussion ...................................................................................... 66 
Rhetorical Implications ............................................................................................................. 66 
Political Implications ................................................................................................................ 76 
Methodological Implications .................................................................................................... 80 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 83 






My eternal thanks LeAnn Brazeal for your faith in me. I thank Craig Brown and Aaron 
Duncan, who, in their own ways, inspired me. Thank you to the KSU Department of Speech 





Chapter 1 - Introduction 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen members of an Islamist religious sect 
known as al Qaeda boarded four airplanes departing from three northeastern United States cities: 
Boston, Massachusetts; Newark, New Jersey; and Washington, D.C. They hijacked each plane 
by forcefully wresting navigation controls and killing pilots and some flight crew. At 8:46 a.m., 
members of al Qaeda flew the first airplane, U.S. Flight 11, into the North Tower of the World 
Trade Center, an office building complex located in the financial district of New York City. The 
airplane struck between the North Tower's 93rd and 99th floors. The crash killed all flight 
passengers and launched a massive fire, bolstered by full tanks of volatile jet fuel, that quickly 
blocked all building fire escapes and trapped over 1,350 people above the building's 99th floor. 
At 9:03 a.m., the next airplane, U.S. Flight 175, crashed into the World Trade Center's South 
Tower between the 77th and 85th floors. The crash killed more than 650 people and sparked 
another large fire, but a single fire escape remained intact for evacuation. More than 10,000 
people evacuated both buildings while fire slowly melted the towers' steel superstructures. At 
9:37 a.m., the third airplane, U.S. Flight 77, struck the Pentagon, instantly killing all flight 
passengers. After hijackers took control of Flight 93, passengers and remaining crew learned 
about the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks through cell phone communication and 
attempted to retake control of the plane, and al Qaeda members crashed the plane in an open 
field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Later investigations determined intended targets were 
either the White House or the Capitol building. The World Trade Center's North Tower and 
South Tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m. and 10:28 a.m, respectively. Enflamed collapse debris 
sparked fires in nearby World Trade Center buildings, and led to the collapse of an adjacent 
office building. Airborne ash and debris spread through New York streets in a fog of grey smoke. 
The combined attacks killed 2,996 people and injured roughly 7,000, including 372 foreign 
nationals (Lansford, 2012). 
The details of that day are now commonly referred to as "9/11."  The name itself is 
rhetorically significant:  
We now shorthand September 11 by reference to its date; it is simply 9/11 and it 
joins December 7, 1941, November 22, 1963, and April 19, 1995 as among those 
moments that we teach our children and our students, that we remember 
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permanently, that we relive in anniversaries and memorials year after year (Parry-
Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004, p. 543). 
These events, and the media coverage that followed, were largely a shared experience 
simultaneously seen by Americans and others around the world. The events were 
mediated by television, print and radio mass media over the ensuing weeks and months, 
culminating in a rhetorical situation that cannot be understated. 
Immediate Reactions to 9/11 
 The events of 9/11 are now considered so pivotal as to have changed America 
permanently and in diverse ways yet to be fully understood. Yet more than ten years after the 
events, scholars can evaluate immediate American reactions with somewhat greater clarity, thus 
providing us a better perspective of the rhetorical situation. In the ensuing weeks and months 
after 9/11, national stress levels, mass media patterns, consumer preferences, gross domestic 
product, popular trends, Federal laws and bureaucracies, and even public eating habits shifted to 
a measurable degree. A brief review of American responses to the rhetorical situation is 
warranted to provide better understanding of the scope and severity of this event. 
 In terms of direct economic impact, 9/11 cost the United States approximately $100 
billion, equivalent to 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Overall, 9/11 cost roughly $1 
trillion in direct and indirect economic loss and reduction in U.S. stock market value. 
Worldwide, 9/11 cost about $300 billion in direct losses to other countries. American insurance 
companies increased premiums by an average of 5 percent across all policy holders, directly 
affecting individual and family expenses. The hardest-hit American economic sectors were travel 
and tourism. U.S. airline industry revenues dropped by 20 percent; foreign tourism dropped by 
12 percent (Lansford, 2012). 9/11 also short-circuited individual spending and consumer 
confidence, with economists warning of "affluenza," "mall-aria," and "a sudden attack of 
prudence" (Scanlon, 2005, p. 174). 
 In terms of socio-psychological impact, 9/11 stands "unparalleled as a cultural trauma 
that demanded response" (Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004, p. 544). In the immediate weeks 
following 9/11, reported levels of stress and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) remained 
remarkably high. In a nationwide U.S. survey conducted after 9/11, 71 percent of survey 
respondents said they were highly depressed by the terrorist attacks two days after the attacks, 
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and 44 percent experienced at least one of five PTSD symptoms to a severe degree up to five 
days after 9/11. Three months later, reported PTSD symptoms remained seven times higher than 
normal (Snyder & Park, 2002). Of 1,008 surveyed in New York City one month after the attacks, 
7.5 percent reported symptoms consistent with a clinical diagnosis of PTSD. Among respondents 
who lived closest to the World Trade Center, that number rose to 20 percent (Galea, Ahern, 
Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvala, Gould & Vlahov, 2002). Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
holds that when a person is faced with reminders of death, the person demonstrates “an 
exaggeration of preexisting ideological preferences and attitudes” (Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S. 
& Greenberg, J., 2003, p. 99). An example of "preexisting preferences" could be comfort food,  
as a calorie-rich tool for easing anxiety. The American Institute of Cancer Research (AICR) 
found that 20 percent of Americans increased their intake of comfort foods after 9/11, and in 
response, the AICR issued a series of pamphlets that warned of the ill effects of too much 
comfort food and included healthy recipes for mashed potatoes, beef stew and other comfort 
food classics (Lofshult, 2003). Three years later, in the height of the 2004 presidential campaign, 
anxiety remained a feature of the race. 9/11-fueled anxiety functioned as a rhetorical "backdrop" 
(Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004, p. 544). Presidential candidates employed patriotic (and 
possibly nationalistic) language that upheld American myths of exceptionalism and high moral 
ground that reinforced "ideological comforts that citizens long for in a wartime context as well as 
those ideologically contested moments that citizens toil to forget" (Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 
2004, p. 544).  
 9/11 stands as a shared, mediated experience highly covered by the media and highly 
consumed by audiences. After 9/11, television was starring in “its biggest role since the Kennedy 
assassination” (Morgensen, Lindsay, Li, Perkins & Beardsley, 2002, p. 102). Eighty-one percent 
of Americans watched television on September 11 and consumed a mean of 7.5 hours (Snyder & 
Park, 2002). Of those who watched television, 18 percent consumed upwards of 13 hours that 
day (Coleman and &, 2011). This “starring role” continued for weeks. Through October 2001 
major American networks ABC, CBS and NBC doubled the amount of news coverage in their 
nightly news broadcasts (Lynch, 2001).  
 This event stands unique in that it did not fit the typical mold of formal military action. 
There was not an obvious aggressor, and no clear purpose. 9/11 left many questions in the public 
eye and Americans sought reassurance and information about the event: what happened, who the 
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attackers were, why the attacks happened, and if more attacks would come (Perkins & Li, 2011). 
The seemingly meaningless (and ownerless) actions left Americans unsure of appropriate 
response. News media often provided the critical consolation that peopled needed, regardless of 
whether journalists intended to provide consolation or not (Izard & Perkins, 2011). Perkins and 
Li (2011) examined news coverage by major broadcast networks to see which functions it served 
on September 11: 
During the first stage, from 8:45 a.m. to 11 a.m., the key issues identified were 
description of the incident (30.6 percent), severity of disaster (17.9 percent), 
terrorism (15.6 percent), safety concerns (12.9 percent), and U.S. government 
reaction (10 percent). During the second stage of the coverage, from 11 a.m. to 3 
p.m., descriptions of the incident declined dramatically (11.3 percent) wile 
severity of disaster (18.5 percent) and safety concerns (11.3 percent) remained the 
same. The issue of terrorism increased somewhat (17.1 percent), while U.S. 
government reaction (17.5 percent) and rescue efforts (10.1 percent) increased 
significantly. After 3 p.m., descriptions of the disaster decreased significantly and 
were no longer an issue (p. 39). 
As the day wore on, television coverage's functions evolved. Early coverage that 
provided definition of the event - what was happening - led way to a discussion of 
reaction - how the rescue mission was working, and how the government was officially 
reacting. By the late afternoon of September 11, the media and public were already 
looking to the government for explanations and leadership. The public, government and 
media employed a variety of responses to 9/11 that can be characterized as either patriotic 
or nationalistic. 
Patriotism and Nationalism 
 In the weeks and months following 9/11, both the public and press exhibited a mixture of 
patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism and nationalism are different forms of pride for one's 
nation; each form of pride leads to a different form of action. Patriotism is defined as a generally 
positive state of pride and love for country and it is expressed through faith in the nation, love for 
other citizens, and respect for one's country. Nationalism connotes arrogant pride and a desire for 
dominance (Li & Brewer, 2004). Nationalism is marked by "chauvinistic tones" that "lead to a 
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narrow definition of who and what may be considered 'American' and the rejection of out-groups 
who may not fit traditional American characteristics" (Davis & Silver, 2002, p. 7). Patriotism is a 
positive, uplifting action; nationalism is a negative, exclusionary or aggressive action. 
 Many scholars have identified a variety of expressions of patriotism in the weeks 
following 9/11. Both the public and the press exhibited patriotism in a variety of ways. One of 
the most-played songs on the radio in 2001 was Lee Greenwood's 1991 single "God Bless the 
USA." Charitable giving, blood donations, and voluntary U.S. military enlistments rose 
significantly (Lansford, 2012). Between 74 percent and 82 percent of Americans displayed 
American flags on their home, car, or person, which is understood as a public expression of 
patriotism, of "love of country" and American "identity, and a desire to affirm cultural standards 
of value" (Skitka, 2005, p. 2009). 9/11 memorabilia became a lucrative business and included a 
wide range of products such as statues, CD-ROM compilations, posters, "2002" dollar bills, 
commemorative coins and trading cards. They were so pervasive that New York City's Chief 
Attorney Michael Cardozo distributed a cease and desist letter to Ebay in February 2002 in an 
attempt to stem the tide of memorabilia sales, arguing they were "blatant attempts to profit from 
mass murder" (Broderick & Gibson, 2005, p. 202).   
 Journalism, known for its objective and neutral position, was not immune in the 
aftermath of 9/11. Many scholars have identified an increase in biased journalism after 9/11 
wherein news media were explicitly or implicitly supportive of America and U.S. foreign policy. 
Some argue this is because journalists could not be objective observers; they were Americans 
(and in many cases, New Yorkers) embedded in an unsettling attack. Many major cable network 
television news stations were headquartered in New York City. Their employees - New York 
residents whose friends and family were in the midst of the attacks - researched and reported the 
news, and journalists often revealed emotions in both facial expression and in words (Coleman & 
Wu, 2011). "It would be easy to argue that reporters connected with their audience because both 
were united in opposition to a common enemy. The United States had been attacked - and 
journalists on the scene and viewers/readers in their living rooms were affected similarly," 
observe Izard and Perkins (2011, p. 2). Often, news media didn't objectively report the facts, they 
assumed a point of view where they would offer suggestions and answers to problems, and 
challenge government to solve problems (Izard & Perkins, 2011). This media bias was received 
with widespread public support. The number of people who perceived a media bias dropped 
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from 59 to 47 percent, and at the same time,  the number of people who believed the press was 
pro-American rose from 43 to 69 percent. By the end of 2001, Fox News became the most-
watched news network (Lansford, 2012).  
 Following an event as painful as 9/11, it seems reasonable that nationalism could emerge 
as another societal reaction. Some Americans responded to 9/11 with anger and, in some cases, 
acts of vengeance. Possibly summarizing these feelings in his 2002 hit single Courtesy of the Red 
White and Blue, country music singer Toby Kieth sang “We’ll stick a boot in your ass / It’s the 
American way.” The aggressors were foreign nationals, strangers to the public eye. Hate crimes 
against Arabs, Muslims and others rose significantly; a U.S. citizen in Arizona killed a Sikh 
Indian immigrant out of revenge for 9/11, mistakenly thinking he was "Arab" (Akram & 
Johnson, 2002). In a study comparing rhetoric among the public, media and elites between Pearl 
Harbor attacks and 9/11, Schildkraut (2002) finds similar rhetorical responses of national 
identity. In both situations the public galvanized in patriotic support of nation and more vocally 
discussed what it means to be "American," yet Schildkraut (2002) points out that compared to 
the Japanese encampments after Pearl Harbor, the events of 9/11 did not lead to as severe 
government-sponsored encampments of foreign nationals and citizens of foreign descent.  
Although hate crimes were on the rise, nationalism seems to have been most commonly 
visible through acts of silence. Individuals who expressed concern about post-9/11 policies were 
often treated as "unAmerican" and "traitorous" in a wide range of public forums, including 
federal and state government, municipalities, universities, churches and news media. Bird and 
Brandt (2002) found documented instances where dissenting politicians, political organizations, 
political analysts, media figures, school teachers and preachers who publicly dissented with 
Bush’s foreign policy were ostracized, fired, cited or harassed. Attorney General John Ashcroft 
said any member of Congress who opposed the USA PATRIOT Act should be blamed for future 
terrorist attacks (Cassell, 2004). Some higher education institutions disciplined or harassed 
faculty that publicly challenged the war on terrorism and the Iraq War. Sixty-two members of 
U.S. Congress petitioned Columbia university to fire Nicholas de Genova, a professor of 
anthropology, for publicly speaking out against the Iraq War at an anti-war event. Louisiana 
State University fired Dr. Steven J. Hatfill after he was publicly investigated as a "person of 
interest" (though never charged with a crime) for a 2002 anthrax scare (Cole, 2005). News media 
also self-censured or actively rejected perspectives that seemed "anti-American." Harper’s 
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Magazine editor Lewis Lapham described the post-9/11 news media as "propagandists;" he 
reported on numerous instances when experts and columnists critical of the war on terrorism 
refused to publicly voice their concerns for fear of appearing seditious (Lapham, 2002). Major 
television networks refused to air paid advertisements from the American Civil Liberty Union 
protesting the PATRIOT Act. Perhaps the press rarely dissented against Bush's proposed policies 
because they agreed with, and participated in, the narrative that Bush constructed to explain the 
circumstances of 9/11 (Warner, 2008). 
The PATRIOT Act and Other Federal Responses 
 By October 2001, the Bush Administration initiated new laws designed to respond to 
9/11. Some policies were in development within a few days of 9/11. Congress passed the United 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act, or the USA PATRIOT Act, in October 2001 as a large-scale and immediate 
response to 9/11. Congress spent 18 hours deliberating the PATRIOT Act before final passage 
(Bird & Brandt, 2002), and compared to legislation of similar size, the PATRIOT Act and the 
Homeland Security Act, passed in 2002, were "enacted with alacrity; meaningful debate was 
abandoned as lawmakers rushed to legislate ways of preventing future attacks" (Cassell, 2004, p. 
9). The Act was nearly unanimously passed; dissenting Congressional voters were chastised as 
traitors by the Bush Administration (Cassell, 2004). The Act established new laws across a range 
of federal agencies. It gave federal authorities the right to track and intercept communications; it 
granted the Secretary of the Treasury with new regulatory powers designed to find and combat 
money laundering in U.S. financial institutions; it increased efforts to close borders and detain 
and remove foreign nationals; it created new crimes and new penalties for certain actions; and it 
established new procedures for handling domestic and international terrorists (Doyle, 2002). 
These changes allow the government to search homes and businesses without prior notice, to use 
roving wiretaps to listen to phone conversations, monitor computers and email, and eavesdrop 
and attorney/client conversations (Whitehead and Aden, 2002). 
In the early aftermath of 9/11, while public fears loomed, Americans felt comfortable 
accepting new laws that tightened national security even if those laws restricted rights of fellow 
citizens or foreign nationals (Akram & Johnson, 2002). However, the PATRIOT Act has since 
received criticism from scholars and political activists for its potentially negative and possibly 
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unforeseen consequences. Davis and Silver (2002) explain that the significance of curtailed civil 
liberties may have seemed less important at the time, due to the intangible nature of civil liberties 
themselves: "For ordinary citizens during ordinary times, civil liberties issues are likely to be 
remote from everyday experiences; but in certain contexts civil liberties issues assume an 
immediacy that has direct implications for peoples sense of freedom and well-being" (Davis & 
Silver 2002, p. 2). Civil liberties are fundamental to the Bill of Rights, which asserts that citizens' 
rights should be protected from the government. While alterations to civil liberties may seem 
invisible to most citizens at first, "even small infringements, over time, may become major 
compromises that alter this country's way of life" (Whitehead & Aden, 2002, p. 1084). 
 Perhaps because "terrorism risks are highly imprecise and difficult to predict" (Viscusi & 
Zeckhauser, 2003, p. 3), scholars have researched several areas in which the PATRIOT Act does 
not serve its intended outcome either by failing to improve national security or by producing 
unforeseen negative consequences. One unintended consequence of the PATRIOT Act is 
immigration enforcement. "The centralization of immigration power in the hands of the federal 
government in certain circumstances may exacerbate the negative civil rights impacts of the 
enforcement of the immigration laws." That the reaction was federal in nature - and thus national 
in scope as well as uniform in design and impact, and faced precious few legal constraints - 
increased the severity of the impacts" (Akram & Johnson, 2002, p. 297). Although the PATRIOT 
Act was designed to prevent money laundering and obstruct funding to terrorists, its provisions 
may not disrupt terrorist financing for several reasons. Terrorist attacks are not expensive to 
fund, sources of funding remain hard to identify, and terrorists move money through non-bank 
channels (Gouvin, 2003). The Justice Department has detained several hundred foreign nationals 
without convicting them or charging them with a crime, and has refused requests to publicly 
identify them. They are jailed not for what they have done but because they fit within a defined 
class of people of which some may pose danger. The Bush administration declared in November 
2001 that non-US citizens declared suspected terrorists could be tried by secret military tribunal 
instead of criminal court. The tribunals could be held according to rules declared by the 
Secretary of Defense, with attorneys who were selected by the Secretary of Defense, and tribunal 
panels could determine guilt or innocence by a two-thirds vote instead of unanimous decision, as 
is customary in U.S. criminal court (Dworkin, 2002). 
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The PATRIOT Act and other federal actions significantly impacted education in 
America. Higher education is commonly regarded as a source of cultural and economic growth. 
It serves as a nesting ground for new ideas, thus making academic freedom crucial for any 
vibrant higher education system. "Critics of higher education sometimes denigrate the 'ivory 
tower' mentality of these institutions, yet it is this very insularity that enables scientific, political 
and artistic ideas to form, evolve and win acceptance without being unduly influenced by 
economic necessity and popular opinion," note Bird and Brandt (2002, p. 432). Yet after 9/11, 
"academic freedom in the United States [faced] its most important threat since the McCarthy era 
of the 1950s" (Doumani, 2005, p. 22). Not only did many universities independently release 
faculty in the wake of 9/11 for "unpatriotic" actions, Bush administration policies including the 
PATRIOT Act impacted freedom of speech and university research in a variety of ways: 
Consider just a few examples: Foreign students and scholars from 'suspect' 
nations are harassed and even denied entry into the United States without 
evidence they are security risks. American professors are prevented from working 
with gifted foreign scientists and students. Open scholarly communication is 
impeded by policies designed to isolate nations supporting terrorism; library and 
computer records are searched; political litmus tests are used by the Bush 
administration to decide who will serve on scientific advisory committees; and 
scientific reports whose content is inconsistent with the Bush administration's 
ideology have been altered (Cole, 2005, p. 9). 
The U.S. House of Representatives unanimously passed a bill establishing a federal 
"Advisory Board" that would monitor university "area studies" centers and classroom 
lectures to ensure they "advance the national interest," which would "effectively replace 
professional academic standards with arbitrary political criteria" (Doumani, 2005, p. 22). 
The U.S. Treasury Departments's Office of Foreign Assets Control declared that 
publishers would face fines of up to a million dollars and up to ten years in jail if they 
edited scholarly articles by people who reside in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya and Cuba 
(Doumani, 2005). Universities engaged in bioterrorism research were often heavily 
curtailed by new PATRIOT Act regulations, possibly barring researchers from finding 
cures to the world's most fatal pathogens. For example, Cornell University's bioterrorism 
research lab, which researches lethal biological materials such as anthrax and West Nile 
10 
 
virus and searches for vaccinations against them, reduced its laboratory staff from 36 to 2 
per new PATRIOT Act guidelines regulating who may be allowed to work directly with 
lethal biological materials (Cole, 2005). The effects of 9/11 upon policy and institutions 
seem widespread, affecting higher education, immigration, financial regulatory agencies, 
civil liberties and freedom of speech. One must wonder where these effects stem from, 
and what worldview or belief system could have fostered them.  
Leading During Crisis: President George W. Bush 
The September 11 attacks occurred less than one year after President George W. Bush 
was re-elected to his second term in office. A few months before 9/11, in summer of 2001, 
Bush's approval ratings were already beginning to drop to 51 percent, the poorest mark for any 
modern president within one year of re-election (Kuypers, 2006). Yet after 9/11, Bush's 
popularity skyrocketed. “Once the butt of late night jokes, ridiculed for his twisted syntax and 
lack of knowledge about foreign affairs, Bush emerged as the commander-in-chief of a nation 
committed to defeating international terrorism” (Martin, 2002, p. 1A). Bush's newfound 
popularity continued for years after 9/11. His popularity started at its highest point and slowly 
lowered into a plateau of high approval, before steeply dropping several years after 9/11. 
Immediately after 9/11, Bush rivaled Franklin D. Roosevelt’s sustained wartime popularity 
ratings (Cook, 2002a). Sixty-four percent of Americans who were surveyed supported granting 
the president authority to change the U.S. Constitution (Pyszczynski et. al, 2003). Two years 
after 9/11, Bush continued to receive favorably-biased press coverage (Kuypers, 2006) and high 
public approval ratings (Secunda & Moran, 2006). This sustained support continued into May 
2003, when Bush landed on aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln beside a large banner 
declaring "Mission Accomplished", where he announced the Iraq War a success. In coverage of 
this event, only one-third of news sources discussed the possibility for a prolonged battle or 
mentioned any criticism that the event seemed staged (Kuypers, 2006). It wasn't until after the 
"Mission Accomplished" event, when Iraq leader Saddam Hussein's opposition forces 
mushroomed and U.S. casualties escalated, that Bush's approval ratings began to fall and media 
coverage became more critical (Secunda & Moran, 2006). 
Not only did Bush's popularity ratings change after 9/11, his foreign policy stance shifted 
dramatically. Bush's pre-9/11 foreign policy stance was relatively “humble;” he discouraged  
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nation-building and spoke cautiously of imposing American might upon other nations. His post-
9/11 foreign policy rhetoric became “less humble and more belligerent" (Fraim, 2003, pp. 131, 
138). As discussed in the next section, President Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy rhetoric has 
become an increasing source of scholarly attention. 
Bush's Post-9/11 Rhetorical Transformation 
Scholars have examined Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric in a variety of ways, including his use 
of civil religion, crisis rhetoric, war rhetoric and prophetic dualism (Shogan, 2006; Kaylor, 
2011). Bush's foreign policy rhetoric changed dramatically after 9/11, though his rhetoric 
remained imbued with civil religion and faith. A born-again evangelical Christian, George W. 
Bush is arguably “the most evangelical president in American history” (Will, 2004). After 9/11, 
Bush cast himself as a “healing exorcist” bent on removing the “evil” of terrorism (Gunn, 2004). 
“After almost a decade of presidential rhetoric virtually absent of evangelical themes, the events 
of 9/11 all but guaranteed their return” (Gunn, 2004, p. 11). Berggren and Rae (2006) contend 
that Bush's evangelical faith informed his vision of the presidency and U.S. foreign policy. They 
compare the rhetoric of two seemingly opposite political leaders, President Jimmy Carter and 
President George W. Bush, finding similarities in leadership and foreign policy which they 
attribute to each leader's evangelical faith (Berggren & Rae, 2006).  
 After 9/11, Bush often justified foreign policy by rhetorically linking it to America's 
foundational myths of exceptionalism, and America as harbinger of freedom (Stuckey and Ritter, 
2007). He did so through the use of the ideograph <human rights>. Ideographs are "summary 
phrases," or "high-order abstractions," or loaded phrases that carry with them shared meaning 
among diverse audiences, which when employed can unify an audience around that shared 
meaning (Stuckey & Ritter, 2007, p. 648). Bush often paired the ideograph <human rights> with 
the phrase "free markets," suggesting, as Stuckey and Ritter (2007) argue, that Bush saw 
America's "freedoms" as "particular economic 'rights' above political 'rights,'" in particular the 
neoconservative economic freedoms of "free enterprise, privatization, deregulation, 
deterritorialization" (p. 647). Bush also utilized myth and archetype. For instance he rhetorically 
embodied America's "frontier" myth by portraying himself as a modern-day frontier gunslinger: 
"Bush's challenge to those who seek to harm America could easily have been spoken by Wyatt 
Earp or 'Dirty Harry': 'Bring 'em on!'" (Secunda & Moran, 2007, p. 4).  
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 Bush also resurrected verbal certainty; his use of verbal certainty (or resolute language) 
steadily increased through his first 1,000 days in office (January 20, 2001 through October 16, 
2003) (Hart and Childers, 2004). Although situations of international strife typically correlate 
with an increase a president's verbal certainty, Bush's use of verbal certainty was unusually high 
when compared to all other modern Presidencies from Truman to Reagan (Hart and Childers, 
2004). The reason for his strong use of verbal certainty may lie in a perceived lack of legitimacy. 
To bolster his legitimacy in the aftermath of 9/11, Bush presented a narrative that cast the public 
as part of a monumental struggle as epic as World War II, between good and evil forces. This 
recasting of the situation imparted greater legitimacy and strength to his presidential leadership 
(Hart & Childers, 2004). Perhaps another reason for Bush's verbal certainty lies in his use of 
crisis rhetoric. Bush arguably extended crisis rhetoric from 9/11 into the summer of 2002 
through heavy and repeated references to external threats, "evil," and 9/11 (John, Domke, Coe 
and Graham, 2007). By continuously recalling the crisis, he could perpetuate the feelings of 
crisis among audiences, and this in turn would lend more perceived authority and build more 
support for his domestic and foreign policy actions. Ivie (2007b), however, contends that the 
Bush administration's rhetoric of evil in the war on terror and the Iraq War stems from a 
worldview of aggression:  
The nation's shriveled worldview remains rigid - largely unyielding to experience, 
overly closed to reflection, and mainly habituated to an anxious impudence 
regardless of (and even because of) any and all recalcitrance encountered along 
the way to fulfilling its self-proclaimed destiny. Nearly impervious to 
countervailing experiences and disconfirming consequences, U.S. war culture 
feeds on self-induced and overinflated expressions of national peril that transcend 
particular situations and transform specific exigencies into ritualized pretexts for 
violence (Ivie, 2007b, p. 222).  
Regardless of Bush's potential motivations for verbal certainty - whether his rhetoric was 
motivated by economics, a need for public support, or anger, as scholars have suggested - 
one must wonder how this worldview was first presented to the public, if it is consistent 
with any other foreign policy worldviews espoused by past American presidents, and if 
any such worldview carries practical implications.  
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First Complete Rhetorical Response: September 20, 2001 Address 
As seen in the Introduction, the events of 9/11 were widely mediated and apparent, but 
"what these facts meant was anything but obvious" (Zarefsky, 2004b, p. 141). Although a 
terrorist act, 9/11 was unlike any military action, leaving many Americans unsure of proper U.S. 
response (Kuypers, 2006). The attackers were unlike any traditional foe. They were not a nation 
declaring war against another nation, they were not seeking conquer land, and they had no land 
that the U.S. could retaliate against. Left in confusion, the American public looked to the 
government for guidance. President Bush's response would become the people's (and the world's) 
response to 9/11 (Kuypers, 2006). The president could have responded to 9/11 in a variety of 
ways, with any number of policy positions. For example, other potential rhetorical (and political) 
responses could have been to declare 9/11 a crime and to seek punishment for the crime, or to 
describe 9/11 as a lapse in national security, or, as Bush did, to declare 9/11 an act of war, thus 
requiring the U.S. to go to war against the foe (Zarefsky, 2004b).  
President Bush's September 20, 2001 televised address to a Joint Session of Congress 
stands as a powerful and definitive response to the rhetorical situation. Structured in a question 
and answer format, the speech literally answered the public's questions about 9/11 while more 
fundamentally defining Bush's formal response to the terrorist acts and fulfilling the public's 
need for presidential leadership during a time of crisis (Zarefsky, 2004b). Bush's decision to 
present the speech when and where he did, to a joint session of Congress during prime time 
evening hours, established a regal theater that bestowed the speech with authority, surrounded by 
his political peers from both political parties in one of the greatest halls of American democracy, 
viewed by millions of Americans in their homes, with their families. 
 The September 20 speech is a turning point in Bush's earliest responses to 9/11 because 
it seems to be the first complete and fully prepared rhetorical response. The speech is a departure 
from several preceding public speeches. Earlier speeches had less preparation and involvement 
from the president, and explored a variety of ill-received (and not repeated) metaphors such as 
calling the terrorists "folks," calling the American response a "crusade," and calling the first 
military operation "Infinite Justice," a term that Muslim faith ascribes solely to Allah. 
Conversely, Bush worked on the September 20 speech directly with speechwriters and advisors, 
adding his opinions and participating in speech construction and phrasing (Zarefsky, 2004b). In a 
book cataloging effects and implications of the USA PATRIOT Act, rhetorical scholar Cassell 
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(2004) opens with a quote from Bush's September 20 address, implying that this speech was an 
essential part of the Bush administration's response to 9/11.  
Compared to viewership of Bush's other speeches in the weeks and months following 
9/11, the September 20 address was the most widely watched and perhaps the most positively 
received. At the time it was Neilson Media Research's “most-watched presidential speech on 
record” with 82.1 million viewers, ranking second only to the Super Bowl among all 2001 
television ratings (Cook, 2002a). Immediately after the September 20 speech, Bush's approval 
ratings soared to 91 percent, the highest ever recorded by the Gallop Poll for any president since 
the Gallop started in the 1930s (Cook, 2002a). In a CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll, 87 percent of 
respondents felt the speech was "excellent" or "good," and 78 percent felt it clearly explained 
U.S. military goals. Many media columnists declared the speech a success and compared Bush to 
Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill (Zarefsky, 2004b). It was "the speech of President 
George Bush's life -- and he (and his speech writers) rose to the occasion" (Abrahamson, Jones & 
Sempa, 2011, online). Clearly, the September 20 speech provided a cathartic release for viewers. 
Bush successfully explained the events of 9/11 and offered a form of resolution, a new direction 
that Americans could follow.  
Rhetorical Intentions of the September 20, 2001 Address 
 Because rhetorical study gains greater insight from an understanding of the rhetor's 
motives (Burke, 1969; Miller, 1984), this study looks to the Bush administration's work 
immediately prior to the September 20 address, when several major policies were on the verge of 
public issuance. It is not uncommon for Presidents in the modern era to use their rhetorical 
power to gain support for their own agendas. The September 20 address is no different; it is 
rhetorically and historically significant because it is a cohesive declaration of Bush's proposed 
response to 9/11. The speech presents a narrative of the situation, and from that narrative stem 
underlying logical conclusions and arguments to justify recommended policies. 
 The September 20 address is politically and rhetorically significant because it may be the 
nucleus for the Bush administration's future, perpetuated narrative about terror and foreign 
policy. Some scholars and political figures who were intimately involved in policy-making in the 
Bush administration have claimed President Bush intended military action against Iraq not only 
within weeks of 9/11, but as early as January 2001 (Secunda & Moran, 2006) and therefore may 
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have considered war rhetoric a key part of his initial response to 9/11. Bush reportedly said "we 
are at war" upon hearing of the second plane flying into the World Trade Towers on September 
11, and declared to his Cabinet on September 12 that the acts were "acts of war" (Zarefsky, 
2004b, p. 139). During preparation for the September 20 address, Bush told presidential adviser 
Karen P. Hughes, "This is a defining moment. We have an opportunity to restructure the world 
toward freedom, and we have to get it right" (Zarefsky, 2004b, p. 139). The Bush 
administration's National Security Strategy, released in September 2002 as a detailed outline of 
what has later become known as the Bush Doctrine, declares President Bush's September 20 
address his first speech that embodies it (Record, 2003). Attorney General John Ashcroft's office 
was already drafting the PATRIOT Act by the time Bush was preparing his September 20 
address (Cassell, 2004). The president knew this speech was a rhetorically and politically 
significant moment, and he participated directly in its development. Bush intended to use this 
opportunity to advance certain positions that were taking shape at the time, including the 
PATRIOT Act and the war on terror. However, it serves scholarly understand to ask what 
worldview underpinned this speech and provided the essential narrative upon which Bush could 
propose and justify the PATRIOT Act and the war on terror as America's best possible responses 
to 9/11. 
Prophetic Dualism and Metaphor 
 Prophetic dualism is a moralistic foreign policy narrative that divides the world into two 
stark opposing forces of "good" and "evil" and asserts America’s God-given superiority over the 
evil foe (Warner, 2008). The prophetic dualism narrative is a “powerful force of central 
organizing arguments in shaping American attitudes toward foreign policy” (Hollihan, 1986, p. 
369). Prophetic dualism is a complete worldview that defines war as absolutely necessary and 
defines victory as all-encompassing defeat of one's foe. Inherent in this worldview lie potential 
long-term consequences, both practical and rhetorical (Wander, 1984). Metaphor emerges as a 
useful indicator of prophetic dualism's narrative structure. Just as prophetic dualism is a 
"powerful" rhetorical tool, so too is metaphor. "The consequences of figurative expression, both 
substantively and methodologically, cannot be minimized" (Stelzner, 1965, p. 52). One can argue 
that even the terms "good" and "evil" can dance between the realms of literal and figurative. 
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 Zagacki (2007) and Warner (2008) argue President G. W. Bush's Iraq War rhetoric was 
grounded in prophetic dualism. Warner (2008) concludes that the press also engaged in the 
rhetoric of prophetic dualism. They not only parroted "the terms of prophetic dualism in their 
coverage of events, but also [actively sought] out opportunities to reaffirm that they, too, were on 
the correct side of the dualism" (Warner, 2008, online). This leads us to wonder, then, if 
President Bush's first cohesive response to 9/11, his September 20, 2001 address, also meets the 
tenets of prophetic dualism. If this were true, one could explore a variety of implications, both 
practical and rhetorical, surrounding the evolution of Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric, the rhetorical 
relationships between the war on terror and the Iraq War, the public's reactions to prophetic 
dualism and its effects on nationalism, and long-term viability of prophetic dualism as a 
sustained foreign policy narrative. 
Research Questions 
 Little study exists on the potential existence of prophetic dualism in Bush's earliest post-
9/11 rhetoric. One must wonder when the prophetic dualism narrative was established and if it 
could have influenced or informed rhetoric of the Iraq War. Could a prophetic dualism narrative 
have existed as early as September 20, 2001 as a means to define 9/11 itself and to influence the 
public's response, or possibly to justify the Bush administration's earliest post-9/11 actions such 
as the PATRIOT Act and Operation Enduring Freedom, which were launched just weeks after 
9/11? Considering that the September 20 address is now considered the first public unveiling of 
what would later be known as the Bush Doctrine, and that the Bush Doctrine would be a guiding 
philosophy behind the Bush administration's Iraq War, such early presence (and role) of 
prophetic dualism may carry serious implications. The success of Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric is not 
in doubt; his September 20, 2001 address was a rhetorical success. But due to the significant 
political and rhetorical implications inherent in a prophetic dualism worldview, and especially 
one espoused as the first complete reaction to one of the largest attacks on domestic soil in 
American history, an examination of this rhetoric is warranted.  
 Prophetic dualism is a moralistic foreign policy framework dependent on an audience and 
speaker who summon - and require - a religious dimension in order to act on a proposed foreign 
policy. Civil religion is intertwined with prophetic dualism. One may argue that if prophetic 
dualism is present, civil religion must necessarily be present by default. However, this study 
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seeks to reaffirm if this is necessarily true, and additionally this study seeks to explore the extent 
and role of civil religion in President Bush's speech. The first research question: How, if at all, is 
civil religion present in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address? 
 This study looks to President Bush's earliest fully-formed, widely mediated address, his 
speech to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, as the first complete presentation 
of a prophetic dualism narrative. The second research question this study poses: Is prophetic 
dualism evident in President George W. Bush's September 20, 2001 address?  
Prophetic dualism can be unveiled through careful scrutiny of the speaker's metaphorical 
concepts. Clusters of metaphor, or metaphorical concepts, act as a perspective or founding values 
from which the simplified narrative of the foreign policy situation is told. Metaphor is a 
powerfully persuasive tool of language, is unavoidable in practically any form of speech, and is 
noteworthy in carefully constructed rhetoric such as presidential speeches because one metaphor 
may carry very different subtexts from another, and the active decision to choose one over 
another carries implications for the situation and speaker, as well as for the study of rhetoric. 
This leads us to consider the final research question: What, if any, metaphors did President Bush 
use to establish a framework of prophetic dualism? 
Preview of Chapters 
This study seeks to understand President Bush's rhetorical narrative in his September 20, 
2001 address in the realms of presidential rhetoric, presidential war rhetoric, presidential crisis 
rhetoric, prophetic dualism and metaphor. Chapter Two begins with a review of scholarly 
thought on presidential rhetoric. It explores current understanding of the modern rhetorical 
presidency and the importance and relevance of presidential rhetoric in today's world. The 
chapter delves into the prevailing scholarly opinion on presidential crisis rhetoric and 
presidential war rhetoric. In each of these categories I explore the characteristics and purposes of 
crisis and war rhetoric in the modern era. The review continues with a discussion of scholarly 
perspectives on civil religion and prophetic dualism including how they function and their 
relevance in the modern rhetorical presidency.  
Chapter Three reviews scholarly work on the rhetorical device of metaphor, which is the 
key tool necessary to examine the tenets of prophetic dualism. From Aristotle to modern day, I 
explore scholarly understanding of the roles and influence of metaphor in presidential rhetoric, 
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with emphasis on metaphor in presidential war rhetoric, civil religion and prophetic dualism. The 
chapter concludes with a review of the specific analysis to be conducted in this study and an 
overview of the artifact. 
Chapter Four outlines the results of the metaphoric analysis. This process resulted in the 
following metaphorical concepts. It discusses metaphorical concepts, or clusters of metaphors, 
which were identified in the text: FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, NEAR/FAR, 
UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE. It concludes with a summary of the 
worldview, or general arguments, presented through the metaphorical concepts. In Chapter Five, 
I review the extended logical arguments stemming from the metaphoric clusters in order to 
unearth President Bush's underlying worldview. Chapter Five offers answers to the research 
questions and explores potential political, rhetorical and methodological implications that may be 




Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
On September 20, 2001, President Bush spoke to an American public seized in the midst 
of a national crisis. Bush addressed Americans' questions about the events, explained what 
happened and who committed the actions, and declared war against the attackers. This unique 
rhetorical situation encompasses research in presidential rhetoric, presidential crisis rhetoric and 
presidential war rhetoric. Bush's rhetoric, delivered in a time of crisis and war, may also include 
tenets of civil religion and prophetic dualism. If this study is to identify prophetic dualism in 
Bush's September 20, 2001 address, and because prophetic dualism is also imbued with civil 
religion, this chapter concludes with a review of past scholarly work on civil religion and 
prophetic dualism. 
The Rhetorical Presidency 
The relationship between politics and rhetoric is an old one. Aristotle (1897) argues 
rhetoric is a superseding force in human interaction: rhetoric is "conversant not with any one 
distinct class of subjects, but like logic is of universal applicability; and that it is useful, is 
evident" (p. 9). Further, Aristotle claims the purpose of rhetoric is persuasion. "Its business is not 
absolute persuasion, but to consider on every subject what means of persuasion are inherent in it, 
just as in the case of every other art" (Aristotle, 1847, p. 9-10). As humans, we use our ability of 
speech to persuade one another on any subject, including matters of state and war (Burke, 1969). 
The nature of our persuasion and the situation that surrounds the persuasion is worthy of study. 
"Politics begins with rhetoric: what is being said, who is saying it, and for whom" (Wander, 
1996, p. 403). The essential nature of politics, of dividing scarce resources, lies in the choices 
rhetors make in defining the situation, their audiences, and the situation encompassing both 
rhetor and audience. 
While some critics argue that presidential rhetoric has little to no effect at all, that it 
essentially falls on deaf ears, (Edwards, 2003), most believe that it influences the direction of a 
nation and is imbued with the unique authority to both reflect and shape the nation's public 
values (Stuckey, 1995; Cherwitz, 1987; Dow, 1989; Hogan, 1985; Hollihan, 1986; & Newman, 
1975). Presidential rhetoric arguably "defines political reality" in that the president has authority 
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to establish topics of discussion, define complex situations, and shape the context in which his 
proposals are heard (Zarefsky, 2004, p. 611).  
In the 20th Century, the American presidency has undergone a "true transformation" 
wherein rhetoric has become a "key tool of governance" (Tulis, 1987, p. 4). In The Rhetorical 
Presidency, Tulis claims that the rhetoric of American presidents shifted in the 20th Century 
from "the articulation...of presidential policy to the advocacy of particular policy proposals" 
(Edwards, 1996, p. 202). Modern presidents advocate for their own proposals by "regularly 
'go[ing] over the heads' of Congress to the people at large in support of legislation and other 
initiatives" (Tulis, 1987, p. 4). The power inherent in presidential rhetoric is "enhanced in the 
modern presidency by the ability of presidents to speak when, where, and on whatever topic they 
choose, and to a national audience through coverage by the electronic media" (Campbell & 
Jamieson, 1990, p. 1). Kernell (1997) describes this as "going public," when presidents speak 
directly to the public for support, and in some cases, presidents rally the public to push Congress 
to act in the president's favor. The process of "going public" was rarely used by pre-modern 
presidents but is now used so frequently that it barely registers controversy (Kernell, 1997). In a 
study of President George W. Bush's first year in office after re-election in 2002, Cook (2002b) 
concludes Bush's extensive travel and public speaking engagements not only reinforce Tulis' and 
Kernell's assertions, but also suggests that the "permanent campaign" is a fixture of the modern 
American presidency. 
Modern presidents depend on the mass media to share their message with the public, 
inadvertently invoking the mass media as a key player in the modern presidency, but mass media 
- radio and television - did not "cause" the rhetorical presidency. Television and radio existed 
before and without the rhetorical presidency. At points in history, presidential administrations 
and broadcasters deliberately justified and sought promotion of presidential speeches to the 
public (Tulis, 1987). The rhetorical presidency is also marked by a substantial increase in the 
number of speeches, and the speeches themselves include more members of the public in the 
audience. Because a president's time is spent more on speechmaking, it can be argued that the 
president's traditional means of governance has shifted from substantive roles to ceremonial roles 
(Stuckey & Antczak, 1996).  
The rhetorical presidency expands upon current political science paradigms led by 
scholars such as Richard Neustadt in his book Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. 
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Neustadt's work recognized the president's "power with public opinion" (Windt, 1986, p. 102). In 
addition to powers granted to the president by the constitution and the president's powers as 
leader of a political party, the president also has, and must deftly handle, the power of 
persuasion, Neustadt argued. Based on Neustadt's work, scholars in the fields of history, political 
science and journalism began to explore how presidents could persuade the public. The rhetorical 
presidency is a modern extension of the president's power of persuasion. The president's actual 
constitutional authorities have changed only slightly; modern presidents have all the same 
political authorities as Alexander Hamilton (Tulis, 1987). It is not outside forces causing the 
rhetorical presidency, but rather a shift in paradigm established by Woodrow Wilson and 
expanded in different ways by ensuing presidents (Tulis, 1987). Neustadt's Presidential Power 
may not have widely recognized the rhetorical presidency, or as Kernell (1997) describes it, 
"going public," because it is a subversive strategy that undermines bargaining as a vehicle of 
persuasion. "Going public" undermines democratic principles of debate and bargaining. It cuts 
opportunities for closed-doors compromise and prevents future compromise by disallowing 
private feedback and discussion. By asking the public to tell their Congressional representatives 
what to do, the president forces Congress to accept his will (Kernell, 1997). It implies negative 
consequences for those who disagree: "If targeted representatives are lucky, the president's 
success may cost them no more than an opportunity at the bargaining table to shape policy or to 
extract compensation. If unlucky, they may find themselves both capitulating to the president's 
wishes and suffering the reproach of constituents for having resisted them in the first place" 
(Kernell, 1997, p. 3).  
 Presidential speeches have gained significant power under the rhetorical presidency, and 
if a president is a particularly skilled orator, that power is further enhanced. Through research of 
a database of more than 10,000 presidential speeches between the Truman administration and 
late 1985, Hart concludes rhetoric is a powerful tool of presidential leadership and potentially too 
powerful because it may overpower Congress (Hart, 1987). Several scholars concur that the 
rhetorical skill of a president can substantially impact the president's ability to make change.  
Presidential speeches alter public perceptions of policy and the president (Stuckey & Antczak, 
1996) and they focus the public's attention on certain issues. Stuckey contends, “it is often the 
president’s rhetoric that … defines [a situation] in such a way that the nation’s response is clearly 
implied” (1992, p. 246). A president's rhetorical skill - his or her rhetorical presidency - is a 
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power in itself. Ronald Reagan, a shining example of a strong rhetorical presidency and known 
as the "Great Communicator," used his rhetorical skill to successfully establish the "Star Wars" 
defense program, pass tax reform, and cut the national budget (Tulis, 1987). Although scholars 
generally agree with Neustadt's assertion that presidents now require strong rhetorical skill in 
order to successfully wield the "power to persuade," only five modern presidents are known for 
that skill: Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy, Reagan and Clinton (Berggren & Rae, 
2006). Presidents do not always successfully persuade their audiences; rhetorical criticism is a 
valuable tool for understanding how presidents are (or aren't) rhetorically successful. 
The rhetorical presidency can be traced to President Woodrow Wilson (Tulis, 1987). 
During his more than thirty years in politics, Wilson advocated a plethora of changes to national 
governance, such as allowing the president to select Cabinet members from Congress and 
synchronizing the dates of terms served by the president and Congressional representatives, 
through a series of public speeches and essays. Wilson's constant advocacy was motivated by a 
set of underlying beliefs that would eventually form the rhetorical presidency. First, Wilson 
believed presidents could - and should - proactively make policy by exerting stronger leadership 
roles in the public realm. Presidents could "interpret" the will of the masses and create policy that 
fulfill the public's wishes. This "interpretation," however, is not the same as following public 
opinion polls (Tulis, 1987). Wilson believed that the Constitution’s separation of powers 
prevented the executive from leading Congress toward proactive policymaking and instead, the 
president could only negate bad policies proposed by Congress. Second, Wilson believed the 
separation of powers prevented effective deliberation in Congress. He believed good deliberation 
should be powerful enough to rouse the interest of the public; it should constantly address 
fundamental issues such as identity or principles. Detailed discussions of minute details were 
only interesting to vested factions, and Congressional committees were "hidden away" from the 
public eye: 
"The ordinary citizen cannot be induced to pay much heed to the details, or even 
the main principles of lawmaking," Wilson wrote, "unless something else more 
interesting than the law itself be involved in the pending decision of the 
lawmakers." For the founders this would not have been disturbing, but for Wilson 
the very heart of representative government was the principle of publicity: "The 
informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative 
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function." The informing function was to be preferred both as an end in itself and 
because the accountability of public officials required policies that were 
connected with one another and explained to the people. Argument from 
'principle' would connect policy and present constellations of policies as coherent 
wholes to be approved or disapproved by the people (Tulis, 1987, p. 127) 
"The rhetorical presidency is not simply good or bad, but rather both," notes Tulis (1996, p. 3). 
Because the rhetorical presidency "transforms crisis politics into normal politics" (Crockett, 
2009, p. 933), it is a more appropriate strategy when used in times of actual crisis. However, in 
normal times a president can distort relatively mundane issues when presenting them within a 
context of identity and principles (Tulis, 1996). 
 Tulis' rhetorical presidency has been questioned by scholars; responding refutations have 
further elucidated and refined it. For instance, some disagree with Tulis outright, contending that 
pre-modern presidents engaged in rhetorical tactics many times and used vibrant public appeals 
and communications, citing William McKinley and Abraham Lincoln as examples. However, 
scholars have responded to such claims by noting that McKinley worked in the same time as 
Wilson and could have been influenced by Wilson's actions and philosophy, while Lincoln faced 
the largest crisis in our nation's history and was rightfully compelled to speak to the public 
(Crockett, 2009). Another challenge made against the rhetorical presidency is that pre-modern 
presidents often "spoke" to the public through open letters. However, some see differences 
between the written form and the spoken form: 
Mode is important. If one has only a written text to engage, one is forced to 
wrestle with the printed words - the quality of the argument. When watching or 
listening to a speech, personal qualities such as emotion and temper and charisma 
can affect reception (Crockett, 2009, p. 934). 
Furthermore, open letters do not "go over the heads of Congress" in the same way Tulis 
describes presidential rhetoric. Letters are tempered written arguments, part of the deliberative 
process, and lack the charisma and emotion necessary for rousing the public (Crockett, 2009).  
 Another element of the rhetorical presidency is its ability to cement certain issues in the 
public agenda that may outlast a single president. In effect, the rhetorical presidency can create 
"legacy" issues which succeeding presidents must face. If a president introduces bold, new 
directions in his or her term, future presidents may adopt the underlying premises of those 
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concepts and enact policies to support those premises. Rhetoric is a "determinative force:" "if a 
person feels required to make a certain statement, he or she will act differently as a result" (Hart, 
2006, p. 256), and this logic also applies to presidential rhetoric. For example, by the time 
Eisenhower entered the presidency, Franklin Roosevelt's rhetorical legacy of social security had 
become a political legacy. The "Social Security system - probably the single most popular piece 
of legislation ever enacted in U.S. History - had been drawn tightly to the nation's bosom" (Hart, 
2006, p. 259). In turn, Kennedy inherited Eisenhower's Cold War rhetoric. Eisenhower's Crusade 
for Freedom, a years-long persuasive campaign, "represents some of the essential features of 
Cold War discourse" (Hart, 1987, p. 646).   
As history unfolds, as new legislative arrangements are worked out, as new 
compromises are effected and then translated into new orthodoxies, an attendant 
rhetoric develops to superintend them. That is, history is constantly being 
performed in politics, and its performers are frequently collusive. These processes 
often stand partisanship on its head as fresh alliances are formed, alliances that no 
single leader may fully embrace but that none dares abandon (2006, p. 259-260). 
With this in mind, this study draws parallels in the presidency of George W. Bush. John, Domke, 
Coe and Graham (2007) quantitatively studied the use of "evil" language, external threats and 
references to 9/11 in presidential public communications from June 6 to November 5, 2002, and 
found that in all categories, Bush "heavily emphasized the themes and did so with remarkable 
consistency" (2007, p. 204).  They conclude that, through constant public communications on 
domestic "homeland" security and the war on terror, Bush "extended the sense of national crisis 
from September 11 to Saddam and Iraq in a manner that significantly shaped U.S. New 
coverage, benefited the Republican Party, and set the nation on a course toward the Iraq war" 
(John, Domke, Coe and Graham, 2007, p. 197). The U.S. intervention in Iraq was subsequently 
rhetorically framed by Republican 2008 presidential candidates as a "battlefield in the global war 
against radical Islam" (Bostdorff, 2009, p. 230). 2008 Presidential candidates Romney, 
Tancredo, Brownback, Giuliani, and McCain said they perceived the war to be part of a larger 
effort to defeat violent jihad and radical Islam in various parts of the world, and to create what 
Giuliani described as "an Iraq that will act as an ally for us in the Islamic terrorist war against us" 
(Bostdorff, 2009, p. 231) The lone dissenting perspective was Ron Paul's. Paul "did his best to 
dissociate Iraq from 9/11 specifically and the fight against terrorism generally" (Bostdorff, 2009, 
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p. 231). If Hart's "determinative force" is accurate, one could argue that Bush's rhetoric had a 
"determinative force," in that his post-9/11 foreign policy agenda was later continued by 
Republican presidential candidates in subsequent campaigns. 
 Presidential rhetoric has the power to shape public values, define political reality, and 
imply the nation's response to a given situation. Although presidential rhetoric is arguably most 
appropriately used in times of crisis, the "rhetorical presidency" is now an everyday fixture of 
American politics. In the modern era, presidential rhetoric has evolved into a necessary tool of 
leadership and governance wherein presidents are engaged in a "perpetual campaign" for their 
policies. They now regularly go "over the heads of Congress" to appeal their policies, values, and 
important issues directly to the public. Furthermore, once a president introduces a new and 
compelling idea to the public, the idea may outlast the president's stay in office and become 
embedded in the national agenda. The modern rhetorical presidency is best suited to times of 
crisis, as some have argued, due to the nature of presidential rhetoric to reflect and shape public 
values, which can quickly calm the public. Considering the nature of 9/11 as one of the most 
immediate cultural crises in modern American history, a more detailed discussion of presidential 
crisis rhetoric is warranted. 
Presidential Crisis Rhetoric 
 Theodore Windt, one of the first scholars to study presidential crisis rhetoric, identified 
three aspects of crisis rhetoric that distinguish it from other forms of presidential rhetoric: 
First, there is the obligatory statement of facts. Second, there is the establishment 
of a "melodrama" between good (the United States) and evil (traditionally the 
Soviets). Third, the policy announced by the president and the asked-for support 
are framed as moral acts (Kuypers, 1997, p.18). 
Scholars have applied these elements to both Cold War and post-Cold War rhetoric. Windt 
examined them in Kennedy's rhetorical responses to the Cuban Missile Crisis and Nixon's 
announcement of sending troops into Cambodia. Others have found these same elements in  
post-Cold War rhetoric employed by G. W. Bush and Clinton regarding international crises in 
Haiti and Bosnia, respectively (Kuypers, 1997).  
What actually constitutes a crisis and the types of responses a president can make to a 
crisis can vary. Public crises are “natural or manmade events that pose an immediate and serious 
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threat to the lives and property or to the peace of mind of large numbers of citizens” (Graber, 
1980, p. 225). "Rhetoric plays an important role in framing national responses to international 
emergencies. In fact, it is widely held that international crises are rhetorical artifacts: events 
become crises, not because of unique sets of situational exigencies, but by virtue of discourse 
used to describe them" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 307). The way a president describes the 
crisis - establishes the "facts" - can distort the situation and in turn, this gives the president 
leeway to exaggerate or minimize a given situation. However, much of this scholarly work 
applies to international situations that do not include direct military attacks upon the United 
States. In cases of military strike, the president has less leeway to choose whether or not to 
define the situation as a crisis: it is a crisis.  
Times of international crisis are created by the president, or "promoted," because 
presidents "advance a specific claim and bring it to the attention to others" (Bostdorff, 1994, p. 
1). "Promote" does not mean "concoct," although a president can promote a crisis whether they 
perceive it to be legitimate or just "politically expedient" (Bostdorff, 1994, p. 2). Promotion is of 
necessity: foreign locales and peoples, often the sources of crises, are remote to American 
audiences and presidents must persuasively present claims of crisis in order to achieve related 
policy goals. Presidents have sensitive information that others do not, and are responsible for 
presenting this information in order to justify a response.  
 Crisis rhetoric is as important, if not more important, than policy for successful crisis 
management. A president's "words perform acts significant to the management of crises. In a 
sense, presidents 'do by saying' when responding to international crises" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 
1986, p. 308). Upon recognizing a crisis, the president must respond with decisiveness, 
immediacy and urgency (Kuypers, 1997). Times of crisis are not times of discussion and debate. 
"By announcing the crisis, the president asks for his decision to be supported, not for debate 
upon what should be done" (Kuypers, 1997, p. 17).  
 Presidents can handle foreign powers and response to international crises in a variety of 
ways, and much attention has been given to various genres and categorizations of crisis rhetoric. 
Presidential crisis rhetoric can be divided into deliberative and epideictic genres, though 
epideictic and deliberative rhetoric can coexist in a single speech because a president must both 
define the crisis and suggest a response to it (Dow, 1989). Presidential crisis rhetoric can also be 
categorized as either consummatory and justificatory rhetoric (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986). 
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Consummatory rhetoric seeks to swiftly close the crisis at hand while simultaneously stressing 
"the importance of caution, patience, resolve and inner strength in reaction to wrongful deeds" 
(Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 310). It calls for "the perpetrators to carry out certain (U.S. 
prescribed) actions to close the crisis. ... It demands, it seeks to effect a change or induce action" 
(Kuypers, 1997, p. 20). Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) review Reagan's response to the downing 
of commercial jetliner 007 as an example of consummatory rhetoric. Reagan stated: "With our 
horror and sorrow, there is a righteous and terrible anger. It would be easy to think in terms of 
vengeance, but that is not the proper answer. We want justice and action to see that this never 
happens again" (cited in Cherwitz and Zagacki, 1986, p. 310). Reagan's reaction confines the 
crisis as a one-time event and prescribes the most appropriate emotional response as a relatively 
conservative action to prevent any future incidents. In contrast, justificatory rhetoric is a 
declaration and rationalization of a responsive action to "unprovoked, aggressive and hostile 
offenses perpetrated by ruthless, savaged and uncivilized enemies" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, 
p. 309) . It is "irrevocable, direct and decisive, announcing concrete, definitive, military moves 
taken in response to malevolent actions of foreign nations" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986, p. 310). 
It is so definitive that it "initially constitutes the government’s official reply" to the crisis 
(Kuypers, 1997, p. 20). An example of justificatory crisis rhetoric may be President Ford's 
response to the seizure of U.S.S. Mayaguez, when he stated, "in view of this illegal and 
dangerous act, I ordered ... United States military forces to conduct the necessary reconnaissance 
and to be ready to respond if diplomatic efforts ... were not successful" (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 
1986, p. 310). However, some scholars caution against classifying crisis rhetoric as a method for 
interpreting speech. Classifications may create a narrow perspective or either-or perspective of 
the president as actor or reactor, as defining action or justifying action. Any research that follows 
a category may overlook potentially important information, if that information runs contrary to 
the category. Crisis rhetoric genres could instead be used as a means to greater understanding, or 
as a starting point for analysis, but not necessarily as a narrowed interpretation of events. Crises 
are uniquely complex and fast-paced moments, and classification could oversimplify them. The 
classification of "fluid events" such as crises could "lead to a limited view of the range of 
possible communication practices" (Kuypers, 1997, p. 24). To avoid potential oversimplification 
or narrow classification of presidential crisis rhetoric, a critic could also analyze public 
knowledge along with presidential rhetoric. The public authorizes the president to act on its 
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behalf, and therefore any president experiencing a foreign policy crisis situation must, through 
rhetoric, gain authorization from the public to respond to the crisis. Examination of media 
coverage and public responses offers insight into how the issue is seen from the eyes of the 
people. This form of critical lens is especially useful for crises that do not involve military attack 
agains the United States or for crises that evolve slowly over a period of time (Kuypers, 1997). 
 Many scholars concur that during times of crisis, Americans seek reassurance and 
comfort from the president (John, Domke, Coe & Graham, 2007; Kuypers, 1997; Parry-Giles & 
Parry-Giles, 2004). “During a crisis, it is seen as almost unpatriotic to criticize the president or 
cast doubt on the country’s future,” explains Cook (2002a, p. 237). In the immediate wake of a 
public crisis “the major task, individually and collectively, is that of integrating the traumatic 
event into the fabric of social life in order to make it less threatening" (Neal, 1998, pp. 9-12). 
Presidential leadership is comforting and clarifying. To provide comfort, presidents sometimes 
employ patriotic language that is rooted in the myths of American exceptionalism. Such 
language reinforces traditionally held myths that America is a morally superior and united group 
(Parry-Giles & Parry-Giles, 2004). The crisis is abated through a return to nation, a sense of 
national pride, and a confidence in America's institutions. The oft-noted tendency for the public 
to "rally 'round the flag" in times of crisis is dubbed the rally effect (Stuckey & Atczak, 1996). 
Attitudes toward the nation become stronger and the public expresses various tones of support, 
though it must be noted, the rally effect also depends on favorable media coverage as well as 
bipartisan policy support (Stucky & Antczak, 1996).   
When the public experiences a crisis (when they sense a threat to their lives, property or 
peace of mind), they look to the president for guidance. Presidential crisis rhetoric re-knits the 
country and launches the public toward appropriate response. In times of crisis, words are more 
important than policy. Typically, presidential crisis rhetoric will state the facts, establish a 
"melodrama" narrative of the situation, propose policy response, and ask for the public's support. 
Both the proposed policy and requested support are framed as morally good responses to the 
crisis. Presidential crisis rhetoric is most successful when the president responds immediately 
and decisively when the crisis emerges. Furthermore, presidents typically choose between two 
major types of response: consummatory, or a cautious response that seeks to close the crisis; or 
justificatory, which seeks irrevocable, decisive and responsive action.  
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On occasion national crises are entangled with war. Military strikes on American soil or 
instigating attacks against American allies, have prompted presidents to declare war as the best 
response to the crisis. In these instances, presidential war rhetoric is often employed along with 
presidential crisis rhetoric. In this study, President Bush's September 20, 2001 address is an 
example of both presidential crisis rhetoric and presidential war rhetoric. President Bush explains 
the crisis and responds to it by declaring a war on terror. Because Bush's speech called for public 
approval and authority for the war on terror, a review of war rhetoric is warranted. 
Presidential War Rhetoric 
 In response to a crisis, a president may call America to war against a foreign foe. In these 
cases, presidents employ "war rhetoric," a genre of presidential rhetoric that legitimizes the 
president's use of war powers. The purpose of presidential war rhetoric is to persuade the nation 
to support the president's proposed war strategy (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 101). 
"Presidents have a significant advantage in exercising military power independent of the 
legislature" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 102), and a simple look at past U.S. military action 
can verify this. Although the U.S. Constitution assigns Congress the sole authority to declare war 
and Congress has only officially declared war five times in American history, U.S. presidents 
have issued orders for more than 220 military ventures (Secunda & Moran, 2007).   
 Presidential war rhetoric merits its own genre of rhetorical study because it has 
distinguishable and repeated categories of speech. Over time, U.S. presidents, both pre-modern 
and modern, have repeated the same patterns of argument to justify war. This is arguably 
because war itself has recognizable patterns of participants and circumstances. "Even the 
perceived likelihood of war is an identifiable historical situation which usually calls forth many 
rhetorical endeavors addressed to various audiences and propounding various points of view 
relating to war" (Reid, 1976, p. 259).  
 War is embedded in the human psyche, laden with mythic acts and players. It is an 
"exercise in ritual, a sacrament of symbolism, and an enactment of tragic theatre" (Ivie, 2007a, p. 
2). It is a force that gives purpose to its people. It suspends negative criticism of the 
establishment and it helps make an "us-versus-them" world seem easier to understand. The call 
to war can be a seductive one. War itself is a "guilty pleasure" and the "deep yearning to prove 
one's nobility under fire" is a "powerful narcotic" (Ivie, 2007a, p. 2). If the public has already 
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accepted narrative arguments in favor of war, they will be ready and possibly eager to fight when 
the president calls them to action.  
Presidential war rhetoric typically has five characteristics (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). 
First, war rhetoric proclaims that war is a deliberate choice that was reached through careful 
consideration. For example, prior to war against Spain, President McKinley said of Spain's 
sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, "The appalling calamity fell upon the people of 
our country with crushing force, and for a brief time an intense excitement prevailed ... This 
spirit, however, soon gave way to the calmer processes of reason and to the resolve to investigate 
the facts" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 106).   
Second, war rhetoric establishes a narrative form of the situation and utilizes the narrative 
to establish supporting arguments in favor of war. The rhetor creates a compelling story from 
which the rhetor draws persuasive arguments. The narrative is a dramatized yet simple re-telling 
of the facts that portrays the enemy as an aggressor and the president's proposed actions as the 
best means of defense. The enhanced narrative also pits the enemy against "the sorts of cherished 
national values rehearsed and reinvigorated in presidential inaugural addresses ... in order to 
rebuff implications of self-interest" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 107). Although this 
characteristic seems to contradict the reasoned and logical approach of the first characteristic of 
war rhetoric, the narrative is not a reasoned and logical re-telling of events, and the first 
characteristic is not, either; the first characteristic simply is the rhetor's statement that he or she 
underwent careful, but private, deliberation. Narratives are "powerful elements" of persuasion 
(Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 111). The narrative provides a basis for arguments in favor of 
war. This characteristic is a form of justificatory rhetoric in that the narrative and ensuing 
arguments prove that "a threat imperils the nation, indeed, civilization itself, which emanates 
from the acts of an identifiable enemy and which, despite patient search for an alternative, 
necessitates forceful, immediate response" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 107). Ivie (1982) 
explores this characteristic in critical study of the War of 1812, contending that through the use 
of metaphor, the pro-war Republican party successfully established a consistent narrative and 
subsequent arguments of British barbarity so savage it could cause "the ruination of American 
independence" (1982, p. 241). Additionally, George H. W. Bush's rhetoric successfully 
established a narrative "vision of the past" that recalled the glory of World War II, which helped 
garner favorable public opinion of the Persian Gulf War and of Bush's leadership. Leading up to 
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the Persian Gulf conflict, after Bush had already declared hostilities against Iraq, the media and 
the public weighed involvement as a potential disaster reminiscent of the Vietnam conflict. 
Without Bush's decision to create a powerful narrative and justificatory rhetoric to frame the 
Persian Gulf as "a return to World War II," the war would probably not have been supported 
(German, 1995, p. 293). Bush's strong narrative and justificatory rhetoric turned public support 
and garnered the necessary political power to go to war. Presidents who choose not to engage in 
war rhetoric will likely fail, but if a president is unable to construct a persuasive and engaging 
narrative, the president's war rhetoric may also fail.  
Third, war rhetoric calls upon the audience for unanimous support and full commitment 
to the cause. This characteristic is typically most evident immediately after war has been 
declared. This argument stems from the narrative. The narrative "constitutes the audience as a 
united community of patriots that is urged to repulse the threat with all available resources" 
(Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 111). This characteristic is also more perfunctory than other 
characteristics of war rhetoric and is not necessarily the fulcrum of war rhetoric's success. Both 
Presidents Polk and Madison used nearly identical calls to action in their presidential 
proclamations following congressional declarations of war. Madison stated, "I do specially 
enjoin on all persons holding offices, civil or military, under the authority of the United States 
that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties respectively incident thereto" 
(Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 112). Similarly, President Johnson called upon democrats to 
support the Vietnam war: "Put away all the childish divisive things, if you want the maturity and 
the unity that is the mortar of a nation's greatness" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 112).  
Fourth, war rhetoric legitimizes the president as commander in chief. The narrative is a 
critical tool in creating arguments that prove the president has "carefully gathered the requisite 
information and deliberated about whether conditions require war" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, 
p. 112). Arguments often imply immediacy and urgency; that the U.S. should take action 
immediately if the president is to take charge of the situation. Because presidents are not granted 
Constitutional authority to declare war, presidents have employed a variety of tactics to instigate 
war. From a rhetorical perspective this supports Neustadt's (and later Tulis') arguments that 
presidents are imbued with the power of leadership and they are responsible for leading in times 
of crisis. Campbell and Jamieson (1990) cite historian Abbot Smith's review of President 
Madison for an interesting comparison of what happens when presidents choose not to utlize 
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their power of leadership. Unlike most presidents, Madison strictly followed the constitution's 
separation of powers and generally refused to proactively and independently lead foreign policy 
issues, with what many historians consider to be disastrous results: Madison weakened his own 
reputation and the reputation the executive branch. The War of 1812, initiated by a split vote in 
Congress during Madison's tenure, is arguably the least popular war in American history. Despite 
Madison's efforts to "uphold the Constitution to the best of his ability," "despite all the tenets of 
pristine republicanism, the country wanted then, and has always wanted since, to follow a strong 
leader in times of crisis," notes historian Abbot (cited in Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 114). 
Madison refused leadership - an entailment of the role of commander in chief - because it was 
not expressly stated in the Constitution.   
The final characteristic of war rhetoric is "strategic misrepresentation" of the situation 
(Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 118). In order to "stifle dissent and unify the nation for 
immediate and sustained action" (p. 118), and to call upon Congress and the public to imbue the 
president with authority to lead a war, the president ascends the dramatic narrative to 
"melodrama" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 119). A melodramatic recasting of the situation 
can be extremely persuasive and possibly the crux of successful war rhetoric: "It is difficult to 
imagine a more powerful call to arms than one based on the image of savagery" (Ivie, 1982, p. 
241). Distortion of fact is not to be confused with character fault or unethical tactics. It is a 
strategy that is demanded of the president by the situation. The president claims he or she has 
undergone careful deliberation, but the president does not publicly discuss the issue in extreme 
detail because a deliberative rhetorical approach would not rouse strongly felt and unanimous 
support. In a democracy, unanimous support is rare, but in times of crisis and war, unanimous 
support becomes critical for success. "Because they claim extraordinary powers as commanders 
in chief, presidents seek an extraordinary mandate" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 122). The 
roots of this war rhetoric characteristic may rest in Kenneth Burke's "victimage ritual." The 
assumption that war is always a "matter of last resort" forces the rhetor to argue the United States 
is going to war because it is a "victim" of some other force. The victimage ritual requires that the 
rhetor define this other force in a way that fits the narrative and if necessary, project our own 
faults onto it as well (Ivie, 1980, p. 280). Ivie (1980) uses this approach to critically examine 
President Johnson's war rhetoric and finds that Johnson successfully recasts the situation in 
Vietnam by employing imagery that portrays enemy as a savage aggressor and the United States 
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as a rational and peaceful nation. No single speech, or even a detailed debate, can reveal the 
entire truth of a situation. However, even when taking this into account, the truths of the situation 
are still distorted. Campbell and Jamieson (1990) cite Presidents Polk, McKinley, Wilson and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt of as examples of presidents who have distorted the situation to their 
advantage, and cite a 1797 speech by President Adams, to which Adams' contemporaries 
Jefferson and Madison remarked that he "selectively disclosed facts" to imply that France was 
America's "only enemy of significance" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 120).   
Interestingly, presidents may have the ability to establish long-term foreign policy 
through select strategic war rhetoric speeches. For example, President Eisenhower's September 
4, 1950 "Crusade for Freedom" speech, which Eisenhower and associates spent weeks crafting 
and promoting, is perhaps the genesis of Cold War rhetoric; it contains elements of all key 
archetypes present in Cold War rhetoric and it successfully established a nearly 30-year 
marketing campaign that was later sustained by Truman, Kennedy and Johnson (Medhurst, 
1997).  
Throughout American history, presidents have repeatedly employed the tenets of war 
rhetoric to engage in military conflicts. War rhetoric helps legitimize war, and logically, if the 
public accepts a president's arguments for war, the public will support going to war. Presidential 
war rhetoric often argues that war is a deliberated, calculated decision. Presidents portray the 
situation through a (not necessarily logical or factual) narrative that pits the enemy against 
America and its cherished national values. War rhetoric calls for unanimous support, and 
portrays the president as the nation's leader and military commander-in-chief, worthy of support 
and capable of victory. One can argue that President Bush, like other presidents before him, 
needed to fulfill each of element of war rhetoric in order to rally support for Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the war on terror. This study will explore how (or if) prophetic dualism, a type of 
foreign policy narrative, played a role in shaping President Bush's war rhetoric. Prophetic 
dualism is uniquely rich with civil religion, nondenominational social values that influence and 
shape the political realm. Before exploring prophetic dualism in closer detail, it is important to 
examine the underlying civil religious social values that shape it. 
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Civil Religion in Presidential Rhetoric 
Civil religion has long been part of American politics. The political realm is infused with 
a nonspecific and nondenominational religious dimension that functions as a common 
denominator for our most cherished social values (Bellah, 1970). The term "civil religion" refers 
to a "religious dimension, found I think in the life of everyday people, through which it interprets 
its historical experience in the light of transcendent reality" (Bellah, 1975, p. 3). Civil religion 
stems from millennial-old social structures. Religious understandings of "right and wrong" form 
the basis of society's morals, help a society define itself, and help define other societies in 
relation to one's own. Civil religion can be defined as “the collection of beliefs, values, rites, 
ceremonies, and symbols which together give sacred meaning to the ongoing political life of the 
community and provide it with an overarching sense of unity above and beyond all internal 
conflicts and differences” (Pierard & Linder, 1988, p. 23). Put another way, civil religion is not 
mere boosterism or patriotism; it is the spark that ignites a burning love for country. It is a 
powerfully persuasive "quasi-religious secular faith" that instigates national unity and mobilizes 
the public to work toward shared, national goals (Calhoun, 1993, p. 651).  Civil religion offers a 
lens to see the world: it helps create a shared understanding and perspective of our society, our 
leaders, and societal-level decisions deliberated the political realm. Civil religion is not the 
worship of a nation, and it is not a religion; it is characterized by religious assertions within 
social values and it recognizes those assertions in political rhetoric (Kaylor, 2011).  
Civil religion rests on four notions: First, there must exist a God; second, God’s will is 
known and fulfilled through government; third, America is God’s primary agent; and fourth, 
citizens should identify with their nation in a political and religious sense (Pierard & Linder, 
1998). Civil religion in America is imbued with Judeo-Christian Biblical archetypes of "Exodus, 
Chosen People, Promised Land, New Jerusalem, Sacrificial Death and Rebirth" (Daughton, 
1993, p. 428), which serve to shape national values and self identity. They may also provide root 
for America's "frontier" myth. The frontier myth stems from America's hard-fought perennial 
rebirth in new frontier lands, underscored by the implied assumption that "some men need 
killing" and "some nations need defeating" if America is to create a peaceful and just world 
(Secunda & Moran, 2007, p. 4).  
Political leaders have invoked civil religion to various degrees throughout American 
history. The founding fathers, wanting to maintain a separation between church and state and 
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wanting to respect diverse religious perspectives (including deism, notes Bellah), rarely used the 
word "God" in their rhetoric, instead referring to "Providence," "that Being in whose hands we 
are," and similar phrases (Bellah, 1975, p. 45). One hundred years after Washington served as 
America's first president he had become part of civil religion, "a quasi-deity in American civil 
religion" and a "virtual Moses who had led the American Israel to the promised land" (Calhoun, 
1993, p. 651). Harrison described Washington at the centenary celebration of Washington's 
presidency in terms of his civil religious impact: "To elevate the morals of our people; to hold up 
the law as that sacred thing which, like the ark of Gold of old, may not be touched by irreverent 
hands" (in Calhoun, 1993, p. 651). Through the pre-modern presidency, presidents used civil 
religion in their rhetoric, but few professed that God or their faith directly influenced their 
decision-making. During the rise of the rhetorical presidency in the 20th century, the role of God 
again changed from that of a private belief to policymaking tool. In the 1960 presidential 
campaign John F. Kennedy countered charges that he would allow the Pope to dictate his 
political decisions, saying: "I believe in an American where the separation of church and state is 
absolute; where no Catholic prelate would tell the president - should he be Catholic - how to act, 
and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote" (Kaylor, 2011, p. 3). 
Comparatively, protestant presidential candidates Bob Dole and George W. Bush publicly stated 
they would seek the Pope's advice on policy issues. Kaylor concludes "presidential campaign 
rhetoric has been publicly baptized, with religion becoming a key feature of campaign 
communication and an important voting criterion for a significant portion of the electorate" 
(2011, p. 4). Recent scholars extend the relationship between civil religion and the presidency to 
consider the president a "principal prophet, high priest, first preacher, and chief pastor of the 
American nation" (Pierard and Lindner, 1988, p. 25), though Hart caveats that the president 
could just as easily be called a "First Acolyte or First Citizen" because a president walks a 
delicate tightrope of both leading the public and listening to it (Hart, 2004, p. 516).  
As of his 1975 book Broken Covenant, Bellah (1975) expressed deep concern about the 
possible demise of American civil religion. He acknowledged that America's core civil religious 
values were still present, but he asserted America had strayed too far from its civil religious 
"myths," or interpretations of reality that create shared meaning, in favor of a science-based 
utilitarian society. However, several scholars point out that much has changed since Broken 
Covenant, including the neoconservative movement and the rise of the Moral Majority, and that 
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civil religion is more active in the political realm than ever before (Daughton, 1993; Kaylor, 
2011; Zagacki, 1996). For example, in his critical analysis of a 1993 essay written by evangelical 
leader James Dobson to two million members of Focus on the Family regarding the Fetal Tissue 
Research Initiative that had been recently signed by President Clinton under the National 
Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, Kuypers (2000) identifies unusual rhetoric unlike typical 
doctrinal language and speaker-audience simpatico one would expect of this situation. Before 
cases such as this letter by Dobson, far-right and far-left leaders primarily used extremist 
doctrinal language when speaking to their audiences. The extremist language helped audiences 
feel connected to the rhetoric because both audience and rhetor would "[jump] to the same 
conclusions" (Kuypers, 2000, p. 146). However, by 1993, Dobson was experimenting with new 
rhetorical strategies, and in this artifact, Dobson also used descriptive statements and source 
citations, a combination of scientific and moral arguments, which Kuypers argues were evidence 
of Dobson's attempts to reach beyond Focus on the Family and persuade a wider audience.   
The same president credited for the rise of the rhetorical presidency, Woodrow Wilson, is 
also credited as one of the most overtly religious of all pre-modern presidents. He regularly saw 
political decisions in moralistic terms and believed that the way to understand a person was to 
know his or her religious beliefs. His religious perspective influenced matters of foreign policy, 
where he often used moralistic language, he portrayed politics as a religious calling, he leaned 
toward unilateralism and uncompromising positions, and sought to "convert" others to 
democracy. Scholars have since dubbed similar foreign policy approaches as "Wilsonian" 
(Berggren & Rae, 2006). Wilson's approach is described as "evangelical" leadership, marked by 
"open professions of religious faith and moralizing rhetoric" and "disdain for political 
bargaining" (Berggren & Rae, 2006, p. 609). Evangelical presidents "find compromise difficult 
and are more inclined to try to short-circuit the Washington political process and make direct 
appeals to the public" (Berggren & Rae, 2006, p. 609). As noted earlier, President George W. 
Bush and President Carter had evangelical faiths, and despite their opposing political viewpoints, 
they shared many attributes that have been ascribed to evangelicalism. It is possible that their 
rhetoric may have been similarly influenced by the nature of their faiths (Berggren & Rae, 2006). 
Civil religion is an effective persuasive rhetorical tool for uniting a people and leading 
them to enact shared goals. It rests on four tenets: There is a God; God's will is known and 
enacted through government; America is God's agent; and citizens should identify with their 
37 
 
country in a religious sense. Civil religion has been part of American political rhetoric since its 
founding to various degree, but since the late 20th century it has played an increasingly large role 
in presidential rhetoric. Presidents often serve as the high priest of American civil religion, 
capable of invoking civil religion and imbuing themselves as the leaders and focal points of 
American social values. In turn, social values and religious archetypes are pivotal aspects of 
prophetic dualism, a type of foreign policy rhetoric employed by presidents during times of crisis 
and war. Prophetic dualism relies on the public's acceptance of moral values and God as a central 
player in American might. 
Prophetic Dualism 
 Prophetic dualism, a term coined by Wander (1984), is a foreign policy narrative used in 
presidential rhetoric that divides the world into two camps of "good" and "evil." Prophetic 
dualism's two worlds of "good" and "evil" must be opposed to one another due to their inherent 
values. One side is defined as morally “good.” The speaker associates the “good” side with 
mythic American archetypes of religious faith, a militant God, and freedom. The “good” side 
must oppose the evil foe in accordance with God’s will. The enemy, by comparison, is 
demonized as "evil" and in complete moral opposition; it is "fetishized as everything 'we' are 
not" (Warner, 2008).  
 The second characteristic of prophetic dualism is that “God dampens public debate. ... 
While a ‘crisis’ may argue for an end to debate, spiritual imperatives close it down" (Wander, 
1984, p. 344). Compared to the rally effect, which depends on favorable media coverage as well 
as bipartisan policy support (Stucky & Antczak, 1996), prophetic dualism creates deeper, self-
sustained censorship. Political dissent of any kind is not well received due to the worldview 
framework in which the dissent is heard. One cannot argue against a country that is acting in 
accordance with God’s will.  
 Third, prophetic dualism erodes the middle ground of compromise. Neutrality “may be 
treated as a delusion, compromise appeasement, and negotiation a call for surrender” (Wander, 
1984, p. 342). The speaker portrays the country as locked in a permanent battle. This worldview 
implies that there is no reasonable alternative other than to fight. The nation must fight and must 
win, because neither failure nor neutrality are acceptable. 
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 Prophetic dualism carries severe practical consequences. First, it legitimizes and possibly 
exacerbates nationalism. Prophetic dualism forces those who accept it to necessarily choose 
“good” over “evil.” Because it posits a "life-and-death struggle” (Wander, 1984, p. 345), the 
public is compelled to side with its nation. Because a president's response to crisis implies the 
nation's response (Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986), a president's use of prophetic dualism may 
reinforce or perpetuate the public's expressions of nationalism. Second, a world without 
compromise may become disadvantageous. Wander (1984) cautions those who employ prophetic 
dualism's inflexible stance. Foreign policy can change quickly and compromise may later 
become the best course of action regarding the enemy. Once prophetic dualism takes hold 
however, compromise is affiliated in the public mind with "failure" and is therefore is a very 
tough sell. A leader who later advocates for compromise or neutrality will have a difficult time 
convincing audiences to accept that it is the right course of action. 
 Prophetic dualism's tenets are rooted in rhetorical study of the modern rhetorical 
presidency, presidential crisis rhetoric, war rhetoric and civil religion. Tulis (1987) argues the 
modern president must appeal to the public directly for support. Similarly, John Foster Dulles 
defended prophetic dualism as a necessary rhetorical approach because it was an effective, 
simple way to persuade the public to adopt foreign policy. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
war rhetoric does not need to be logical to be persuasive. Political reality is created by images 
conveyed through political rhetoric (Graber, 1980). Audiences respond to narratives that 
"misrepresent the facts" and narratives that invoke archetypal myths and civil religion. Wander 
(1984), who developed the definition and tenets of prophetic dualism, somewhat darkly reiterates 
the scholarly assertion that moral arguments do not need to be factual to be persuasive: “the 
rhetoric of American foreign policy lends itself to cynical and bitter commentaries on lies, half-
truths, and macabre scenarios” (1984, p. 357). Stuckey echoes Wander’s notion of “fact” when 
she notes “People do not respond to ‘objective facts,’ but to their images of situations” (1984, p. 
246). It is not literally possible for two nations to be diametrically opposed as "good" and "evil," 
yet presidents have successfully used this narrative to gain support for their policies. Prophetic 
dualism is a “powerful force of central organizing arguments in shaping American attitudes 
toward foreign policy” (Hollihan, 1986, p. 369). Wander's conclusions are informed by two 
perspectives. First is "individualism," or the belief that individuals can overcome any 
circumstances to shape their own destinies. Second is the notion of "quest," that America is 
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naturally a "special" nation engaging in a permanent and dangerous crusade against evil in the 
world (Zagacki, 1992, p. 375). Prophetic dualism may have roots in Kenneth Burke's "frames of 
acceptance and rejection," wherein a person uses modes of thinking to evaluate a situation and 
place his or her role within it (Zagacki,1992). 
 Prophetic dualism invokes God in the way Pierard and Linder (1998) prescribe, but for a 
more nationalistic purpose. Eisenhower and Dulles, who enacted prophetic dualism in their 
narrative of the Cold War, saw God as Bellah defined it: God “chose” America for this land and 
purpose (Wander, 1984). Within the prophetic dualism framework, God is on the side of 
America, His will is known, and Americans should act in accordance to His will (Wander, 1984), 
which is similar to the core tenets of civil religion (Pierard & Linder, 1998). There is a unique 
distinction, however, between the God of civil religion and the God of prophetic dualism. A 
person can invoke God through civil religion to simply feel pride one's country, but a person 
invoking God through prophetic dualism focuses on God's militant authority for justificatory and 
possibly vengeful purposes. Prophetic dualism’s God not only “presided over the founding of 
America,” He also served as “co-pilot” in World War II, “…abhorred atheists” and “… loathed 
communist slavery” (Wander, 1984, p. 344). The God of prophetic dualism wields a sword. He is 
actively engaged in America's militant action and wills America to victory in battle. 
Wander outlines prophetic dualism through a study of the Eisenhower administration’s 
narrative of, and justification for, the Cold War. A State Department official from the 
Eisenhower administration argues “…policies merely based on carefully calculated expediency 
could never be explained and would never be understood” (1984, p. 344). Eisenhower defined 
America’s role in the world as a “moral lighthouse” that would not willingly use nuclear power, 
but was forced to have it in the face of Russian threat. Any compromising policy or appeasement 
could have invited nuclear war. “…The surest way to avoid war is to let it be known in advance 
that we are prepared to defend these principles if need be by life itself,” said Eisenhower's 
Secretary of State Dulles (Wander, 1984, p. 345).  
 In a study of George H. W. Bush's hybrid form of prophetic dualism, Stuckey (1995) 
doubted prophetic dualism would ever return from its days in the Eisenhower White House. 
George H. W. Bush used prophetic dualism in a “hybrid form” along with other communication 
strategies in speeches about the Persian Gulf War, the Panama invasion, the liberation of Eastern 
Europe, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Stuckey (1995) concludes this “hybrid” form did not 
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successfully persuade the public to support his foreign policy initiatives, and furthermore, that 
any hybrid form of prophetic dualism would fail. She concluded that prophetic dualism would 
fail in the future because American audiences lacked a unifying orientational metaphor from 
which to understand and accept a prophetic dualism worldview. An orientational metaphor 
would provide the necessary shared meaning from which to understand and agree with the 
narrow tenets of prophetic dualism; shared orientational metaphor would glue together prophetic 
dualism's system of metaphors.  
Zagacki (2007) and Warner (2008) argue President George W. Bush's Iraq War rhetoric 
was grounded in prophetic dualism. In his study of Bush's speeches issued between late 2002 and 
into 2007, Zagacki (2007) argues that Bush regularly employed prophetic dualism to enact 
"constitutive rhetoric" which calls "a common, collective identity into existence" (p. 272). 
Through prophetic dualism, Bush called into being a unified and democratic Iraqi people who 
would in turn legitimize and participate in a new democratic sovereign Iraqi state. He 
individualized the Iraq state as capable of uniting and overseeing its own transformation. 
However, Zagacki contends Bush's rhetoric is failed constitutive rhetoric in that it could not 
overcome pre-existing generations-long ideological identities (and subsequent disputes between) 
Iraq's Shiite and Sunni communities. Bush defined democracy as something "given" to Iraq by 
America; however, Iraq would not "accept the gift" because Iraq could not; it was not a 
collective, single identity capable of assuming the identity that Bush presumed it was (Zagacki, 
2007). Warner (2008) concludes that the American press also engaged in the rhetoric of 
prophetic dualism. He argues they not only parroted "the terms of prophetic dualism in their 
coverage of events, but also [actively sought] out opportunities to reaffirm that they, too, were on 
the correct side of the dualism" (2008, online).  
Conclusion 
 The events of 9/11 created a rhetorical situation that all but required presidential rhetoric. 
Scholars concur that presidential rhetoric in times of crisis is required in order to quell public 
concerns, reduce fear, and lead the nation toward a course of action. War rhetoric, which may 
emerge as a possible response to a crisis, carries its own unique demands; it requires the 
president to present a compelling (though not necessarily logical, and usually strategically 
inaccurate) narrative of the situation, a narrative from which the president portrays himself (or 
41 
 
herself) as a qualified commander in chief, calls for united support, and declares that the decision 
to go to war was a carefully deliberated decision. Since the late 20th century, presidents have 
increasingly invoked civil religion in national discourse. Civil religion is an especially powerful 
persuasive device that portrays America as morally "good," as God's agent; and persuades the 
public to identify with their country in a religious sense. Some presidents have also invoked 
prophetic dualism, a more nationalistic foreign policy perspective that is empowered with civil 
religion to justify foreign policy actions. This study examines President Bush's September 20, 
2001 address to see how (if at all) President Bush employed civil religion, prophetic dualism and 
metaphor. Before exploring this in more detail, it is important to expand on the method of 






Chapter 3 - Methodology 
Metaphoric Criticism 
Rhetorical study can examine presidential rhetoric from a complex range of perspectives. 
Critics can empirically study the relationship between messages and audiences, as Edwards 
(2003) did; one can conduct content analysis to unveil the speaker's motives; or one can dissect 
text, "unpack it," as one would a piece of literature or performance art, including both the text 
itself and the entirety of the performance (Zarefsky, 2004a, p. 610). Each approach offers a 
different set of questions to ask, items to consider, and implications to conclude, all resulting 
from the same artifact of study. Different readings of the same artifact reveal different levels of 
meaning and significance. Although a combination of approaches provide a more complete 
appreciation for the rhetorical situation, it is this last approach that is the interest of this study. 
Zarefsky (2004a) and Smith (1999) build upon Aristotle's (1887) assertion that the study of 
rhetoric is the examination of the uses of persuasion in a given situation. Although each 
rhetorical situation has unique circumstances that may never be repeated again, one finds genres 
and patterns of persuasion in different situations. Each study of a situation can offer new insight 
as well as reinforce scholarly study of the genre in which that situation resides. "Rhetorical 
masterpieces can be studied in the same way that great works of literature are studied: with an 
eye both to offering new perspective on the case at hand and to suggesting broader principles that 
will help to explain rhetorical practice more generally" (Zarefsky, 2004a, p. 611). 
In Poetics, Aristotle defines metaphor as "the application of an alien name by 
transference" from one item to another (1902, p. 79). Aristotle expands on the purpose of 
metaphor in Rhetoric, where he see it as an appealing device because it is something "all persons 
employ; for everybody carries on conversation by means of metaphors" (1887, p. 209), but it is 
nothing more than a decorative aide or "ornament" (1887, p. 210). As Aristotle saw it, metaphor 
does not affect the core substance of a speech. Metaphor is flair, useful for helping emphasize a 
specific point. However, Aristotle's observation that "everybody carries on conversation by 
means of metaphors" may have more meaning and significance than originally intended. Also in 
Rhetoric, Aristotle (1887) defines rhetorical study as "the science of social life." In other words, 
reality and our language of it are two separate things; compared to the study of logic, the study 
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of rhetoric examines how we perceive logic. Aristotle (1887) calls rhetoric a "portraiture" of 
logic (p. 13).  
 Aristotle's notions of reality and language apply more to the study of metaphor in today's 
scholarly environment than Aristotle's own notion of metaphor did in his Rhetoric. Metaphor is 
no longer viewed as a peripheral handy skill that cannot be taught, but rather a fundamental and 
pervasive tool we all use to subtly color our "portraits" of reality. Reality is "whatever we 
describe it as" (Foss, 1996, p. 358), and metaphor may arguably be one of the premier tools we 
use to describe it. Put another way, Aristotle's perspective lacks "adequacy" (Osborn & Ehninger, 
1965, p. 225). Metaphor is a tool that adds meaning to a message, but historically it has lacked 
respect for its fundamental role: "[T]he pragmatic definition of metaphor necessary for the 
pragmatic work of the rhetorician has seldom emerged" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 225). The 
fact that each person has his or her own perspective of reality requires persuasion to exist. We 
need not persuade others (a core function of rhetoric, per Aristotle) if we all share the exact same 
understanding of reality. Metaphor creates new ways to reach shared understanding. "The 
essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 5). It can “remedy a gap in the vocabulary” by offering new 
"words" to explain the world around us (Sapir, 1977). Placing words within context of other 
words creates a new, third meaning that we not only agree on in a culture, but a meaning that we 
act on and live by (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Or as Osborn and Ehninger (1965) describe it, 
"metaphor is both communicative stimulus and mental response" (p. 226). Therefore, a study of 
metaphor can reveal a person's or society's underlying values and beliefs. Metaphor is both a tool 
for constructing reality, and a basis for reacting to the reality we've constructed. Metaphor is a 
commonplace and widely used tool in speech because it is first a tool of thought, used to define 
new things that lack some aspect of definition by defining them in relation to other things we 
already know. We use metaphor to create linkages between new objects, concepts and events. It 
is a reference point upon which we first identify, classify, and begin to understand new things. 
Metaphoric thought patterns provide the basis from which we speak and act.  
Metaphor is so deeply rooted in our language that at times we aren't even aware of it 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Richards, 1936). For example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) examine 
the metaphor argument is war: we (Americans or western culture) tend to believe and think of 
arguments in terms of war, and we speak about augments using terms of warfare. Common 
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phrases like "Your claims are indefensible;" "I demolished his argument;" "You disagree? Okay, 
shoot" demonstrate that the metaphor argument is war is more deeply rooted in our culture than 
it may at first seem: 
The metaphor is not merely in the words we use - it is in our very concept of an 
argument. The language of argument is not poetic, fanciful, or rhetorical; it is 
literal. We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way - 
and we act according to the way we conceive of things (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
p. 5). 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) define metaphors like argument is war as metaphorical concepts, or 
core associative beliefs that we assume to be true and that influence how we make decisions and 
act. Metaphorical concepts are powerful framing devices in that they can convince a person to 
act without logic or reason. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) explain, “The concepts that govern our 
thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to 
the most mundane details” (p. 3). Metaphorical concepts are so common they are systematic: 
they follow patterns that one can study, and they exist as a mediated, shared aspect of a culture's 
reality. Scholars can identify metaphorical concepts and explore how they interact with rhetorical 
situations. "One could study the speeches of a certain type, or the public address of different 
ages, in order to determine preferred patterns of imagery or to trace the evolution of a particular 
image" (Osborn, 1967, p. 115). In the example of argument is war, when we perceive arguments 
in terms of war we take certain actions, speak in certain ways, or adopt certain behaviors to win 
or lose, to concede or challenge, and react to arguments and perceive the entire conversation 
within a context of war. If instead we perceived arguments in terms of dance, we would follow 
an entirely different system of thought and ensuing pattern of behavior: we would strive perhaps 
to intertwine, to show, to display beauty, or create a mutual balance (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Each argument would look very different. The metaphors we choose create patterns of action; by 
studying patterns of metaphor, we can trace patterns of action. Such tracing can be done for just 
one speech, or the speeches of one person; or across a culture, or generations.  
 Metaphorical concepts shape reality in a variety of ways. Metaphor can exaggerate a 
situation, person, place or thing; it can serve as comparison or classification; it can connote new 
meaning; and it can create interaction between two disparate concepts by symbolically fusing the 
two concepts or items (Mooij, 1976). Metaphor communicates complicated concepts quickly and 
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clearly (Stuckey & Antczak, 1996). However, metaphors are not literal and not necessarily 
"true." For example, in the metaphor argument as war, arguments adopt aspects of war, but 
arguments are not literal warfare (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Moreover, some metaphor may be 
culturally bound or experience-bound. Metaphor relies on past images in order to effectively 
reframe new situations or things, and if the audience is not aware of those past images, the 
audience will not be able to make the association necessary to glean meaning from the metaphor 
(Stuckey, 1995; Parry-Giles, 2002). This is not to mean however that metaphors are bound by 
cultures or centuries. Some metaphors are so fundamental to human nature that they transcend 
geography and generations, and can be understood by diverse audiences (Bates, 2004). 
 Based on physical and social understanding, some metaphorical concepts assign spatial 
relationships like up-down, on-off, center-periphery and front-back between two items compared 
in a metaphor, even in technical scientific language like "high-energy physics" (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980, p. 19). These are called orientational metaphors. They orient one item in spatial 
relation to another. They are usually tied to our physical understanding of the world around us. 
For instance, the happy is up metaphorical concept is tied to our physical actions when we 
experience emotions: we droop when sad and we are upright when happy and confident. This 
translates into common phrases like: "I'm feeling up." "That boosted my spirits." "My spirits 
rose." I'm feeling down." "I'm depressed." "I fell into a depression." (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 
15). Another metaphorical concept, high status is up; low status is down, imparts meaning from 
the core notion that "status is correlated with power and (physical) power is up." This is 
exemplified in phrases like: "He has a lofty position." "She'll rise to the top." "He's at the peak of 
his career." "He's climbing the ladder." (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 16). 
 Metaphors can also be categorized as ontological, or as "ways of viewing events, 
activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 25). 
They make it possible for us to deal with complex issues and are so fundamental to our notions 
of reality that they could be accepted as literal. For example, the metaphor the mind is a brittle 
object leads us to say "he cracked under pressure," "he broke down," "she is easily crushed," etc. 
(p. 28). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also identify container metaphors ("There's a lot of land in 
Kansas), visual field metaphors ("The ship is coming into view"), events, actions, activities and 
states metaphors ("The finish of the race was really exciting") and personification metaphors 
("Life has cheated me") (pp. 30-33). Another major category of metaphor is metonymy, wherein 
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"one object refers to another that is related to it" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 35). For example in 
the phrase "he's in dance," dance refers to the dancing profession. In the phrase "acrylic has 
taken over the art world," acrylic is metaphor for the use of acrylic paint. Synecdoche fits within 
this category. Synecdoche refers to metaphors where the part represents the whole, as in "the 
automobile is clogging our highways," where "the automobile" is metaphor for "automobiles" 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 36).  
 At its core, metaphor is comprised of two parts: a tenor and a vehicle. They are 
interpretants, or the parts of the metaphor used to construct the metaphorical concept. For 
example, in the metaphor argument is war, the tenor and vehicle are argument and war. The 
tenor is the subject of the metaphor (argument). The vehicle is the stimulus for the metaphor. 
The interaction between the tenor and vehicle creates the metaphor's meaning (Osborn & 
Ehninger, 1965; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Metaphors are sometimes influenced or directed by a 
third element called a qualifier. There are four types of qualifiers: Contextual qualifiers, 
communal qualifiers, private qualifiers and archetypal qualifiers. Contextual qualifiers extend the 
metaphor, placing it within a larger context. For example the phrase "he was a lion in combat" 
creates a metaphor for the man as a lion, and the contextual qualifier "in combat" narrows the 
meaning to relate it specifically to war (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 228). Contextual qualifiers 
can apply to a specific metaphor as the example above does, or to an entire speech as an 
underlying motif or theme. Communal qualifiers are applied by society or culture at large, in a 
pre-determined way, as conventional wisdom. For example, as a society we approve the 
metaphor "vein of satire" but may be confused by "artery of satire." After long use, communal 
qualifiers sometimes seem to blend into language as invisible metaphors or morph into "dead 
metaphors" such as "leg of the table" or "arm of the chair" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 229). 
Private qualifiers are applied by the individual recipient of a metaphor. The reader or listener 
imparts his or her own unique associations to any metaphors, but this is most likely to occur with 
"'radical' metaphors - i.e., stimuli which assert unusual or unexpected relationships" (Osborn & 
Ehninger, 1965, p. 230). 
 Archetypal qualifiers, however, are "pervasive and generic" concepts "that extend beyond 
the limits of a given time or culture and depend on experiences common to men of many races 
and ages - experiences relived by each generation anew." Examples are "light and darkness, war 
and peace, the land and sea." Unlike communal qualifiers, archetypal qualifiers emerge "out of 
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situations that move men deeply and which, consequently, exert a strong control over how they 
think and feel." Archetypal metaphor qualifiers retain their persuasive power over time; they are 
"like investments in gold, the stable value of which can be relied upon by the long-term 
speculator" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 229-230). Archetypal metaphors stand out as 
particularly strong: "Such stimuli are the most powerful the speaker can summon, since they not 
only enhance the emotional impact of a speech, but identify the audience strongly with the 
speaker's purpose and align them against what he opposes" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 233). 
Archetypal metaphor can have a double meaning in that it is tied to both the metaphor at hand, 
and the id of human existence. "The subject (of the metaphor) is associated with a prominent 
feature of experience, which has already become associated with basic human motivations" 
(Osborn, 1967, p. 116). Archetypal metaphor draws this "basic human motivation" from an 
underlying Western culture axiom that material conditions follow from moral causes. In other 
words, archetypes associate moral character with concepts, objects and cultures. For example, 
light-dark metaphors reinforce a two-value moral perspective: Dark places have evil hosts; 
bright places have good hosts (Osborn, 1967). This is reminiscent of civil religion, a morally-
imbued aspect of political rhetoric. Audiences easily recognize archetypal metaphors; they can 
calm during crises because they reorient audiences with familiar, unchanging concepts. 
Carpenter (1990) explores frontier archetype metaphor in twentieth-century war rhetoric, finding 
it spread across a plethora of communication materials including speeches, pamphlets, letters, 
and news articles. For example, he finds Theodore Roosevelt compared Filipinos to Native 
American tribes in pro-war rhetoric against the Spanish-controlled Philippine Islands, calling 
Americans to view the war in the Philippines as a battle for new frontier. Carpenter (1990) seems 
to concur with Osborn, noting that in cases such as this, metaphor is a critical tool because it 
binds the past and future to reassure and stabilize societies during periods of rapid transition, 
especially war (Carpenter, 1990). 
 Despite its pervasiveness, metaphor can be a tricky scholarly subject. Metaphors are 
difficult to study because "a metaphor may work admirably without our being able with any 
confidence to say how it works" and "a word may be simultaneously both literal and metaphoric" 
(Richards, 1936, pp. 117-118). Meta-language available to describe how metaphor functions is 
scarce. We have one term, "metaphor," to describe an instantaneous synthesis of three or more 
parts of speech: the tenor, or object of the metaphor; the vehicle, or the new meaning ascribed to 
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the object; and the combination of tenor and vehicle, which results in a new meaning (Richards, 
1936). Language to ascribe to a metaphor's success, or objective tools to measure a metaphor's 
efficacy, seem limited. Perhaps this is due to the meta nature of metaphors. It is impossible to 
escape metaphors when using language, including language that analyzes metaphors. Despite 
these limitations however, metaphor has become an increasing topic of interest in scholarly 
thought. 
Metaphor's persuasive potency, its uniquely powerful ability to persuade, has been 
studied by many scholars. Ivie contends metaphor is "the linguistic origin of our most 
compelling arguments" (1982, p. 240) and Osborn concludes metaphor can be found "at the most 
critical junctures in a speech" and that any smart rhetor will "choose them when he wishes to 
effect crucial changes in societal attitude, to speak to audiences beyond his own people, or to be 
remembered for a speech beyond his lifetime" (1967, p. 117). Some metaphors seem to have 
more "metaphoricalness" than other metaphors due in part to the qualifier and the stimulus. 
Personal and archetypal metaphor qualifiers "provoke profound emotional and intellectual 
experiences" due to their persuasive nature; they are intended to persuade more than contextual 
and communal qualifiers. The stimulus also offers a degree persuasiveness. Some metaphor 
vehicles are more unusual than others, and if a metaphor can successfully drive home the 
meaning of an unusual metaphor vehicle, "the metaphor, like a taut bow string, drives the arrow 
of its meaning deep" (Osborn & Ehninger, 1965, p. 232). Although metaphor creates meaning 
"more efficiently and comprehensively" than logical discussion, and sometimes without reason at 
all, the meaning created by metaphor can be perceived as valid enough to judge a situation (Foss, 
1996, p. 361). For example, a neighborhood could be described as "blighted" or as a "folk 
community." Each metaphor could apply to the same neighborhood, but implies opposite action: 
we remove "blight," but preserve "folk community" (Foss, 1996, p. 360). This notion applies 
both to neighborhoods and nations. Perry, remarking that historians have often ascribed the 
successful rise of twentieth-century fascism to the "quasi-mystical personal qualities" of fascist 
leaders, finds that metaphor plays a much larger role than many previous scholars had seen. 
Metaphor, not reasoned discourse, formed Hitler's justification for war and the holocaust: 
"Hitler's critique of the Jew's status as a cultural being, for example, is not illustrated by the 
metaphor of parasitism; it is constituted by this metaphor and the figurative entailments it 
carries" (Perry, 1983, p. 230). Though fascist rhetoric lacked reason, Hitler's infestation-remedy 
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metaphor (and minor metaphors established through it) was eventually accepted as valid 
justification for his proposed action. 
Metaphor in War Rhetoric and Civil Religion 
Although metaphor is not literally true, "nowhere is the temptation to literalize a fertile 
metaphor any stronger or more consequential than in deliberations about war and peace" (Ivie, 
1982, p. 240). War rhetoric requires political leaders to paint an image of the situation worthy of 
immediate and fierce action, and imagery imparted through metaphor is one of the major 
elements in both shaping and justifying war rhetoric (Ivie, 1974). Metaphor's ability to construct 
reality, mixed with an added persuasive potency of metaphor's dual meaning, offers a an 
expedient option for rhetors seeking immediate foreign policy action. For example, Ivie 
researched the metaphor freedom is fragile and demonstrated its power when citing Eisenhower 
administration Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: “securing the ‘blessings of liberty for 
ourselves and our posterity’” has become "a realistic concept of the national interest.’” (Ivie, 
1987b, p.27). In war rhetoric, metaphors "reshape public perceptions of the enemy so that there 
is no alternative to war" (Bates, 2004, p. 451). Forty years later in a post-cold war climate, 
George H. W. Bush employed metaphors of savagery and civilization to define Saddam Hussein 
and United States respectively, before rousing and leading an international coalition in the 
Persian Gulf War (Bates, 2004).  
Civil religion rests at a crossroads between metaphor and myth. The relationship between 
civil religion and metaphor is discussed by Daughton (1993), who argues that metaphoric 
criticism is a good way to examine a rhetor's use of civil religion because at times, civil religion 
"becomes, itself, a metaphor, for it is a way of seeing certain political behaviors and persons in 
the terms, contexts, and roles normally associated with the religious realm" (p. 428). Civil 
religion is comprised of archetypal myths and therefore can recall the same powerful potency 
ascribed to archetypal metaphor by other scholars. 
Metaphor in Prophetic Dualism 
 Prophetic dualism is meant to be “understood as part of the cluster of images, themes, 
grammatical forms, and emotions making up the culture of war in the twentieth century” 
(Wander, 1984, p. 347). Wander’s “images, themes, grammatical forms and emotions” are used 
to constitute metaphoric arguments that construct a rhetor’s overarching moral perspective. 
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“Images, themes, grammatical forms and emotions” reflect the physical world without fully and 
factually representing it. They are subject to the rhetor’s interpretation and can be combined in 
different ways to create a worldview. 
 Metaphoric criticism emerges as a useful approach for identifying and understanding 
Wander’s “imagery, themes and grammatical forms.” It has been used to study prophetic dualism 
(Stuckey, 1995), and metaphor is a common tool used by speakers to create or explain “facts” or 
complex topics. Metaphoric clusters can reveal a speakers’ underlying beliefs. "Recurrent 
patterns observable in the surface language reveal deeper rhetorical consistencies” (Jamieson, 
1980, p. 51).  
Method of Study: Metaphorical Concepts 
This study follows a methodological process discussed by Ivie (1987b) in his analysis of 
metaphorical concepts, wherein the critic groups metaphors into clusters and analyzes each 
cluster as a whole. This “clustering” approach reveals metaphorical concepts, or clusters of 
metaphor that demonstrate a pattern of vehicles. These patterns can better direct the critic to the 
rhetor’s “master metaphors, which more often than not are the essential terms of the speaker’s 
‘terministic screen’” (Ivie, 1987b, p. 29). This study will not discuss each individual metaphor in 
the artifact. The intention of this study is to analyze overarching patterns of metaphor that reveal 
the speaker’s framework.  
This approach involves five steps (Ivie, 1987b). In the first step, the critic conducts a 
detailed contextual examination of the speaker’s environment. In Chapter One, I explored the 
rhetorical situation, including the specific events of 9/11, how the public and the media reacted, 
and how President Bush and his administration reacted. In the case of President Bush's 
September 20, 2001 address, the physical contexts of the speech can be interpreted as well. The 
speech carried timely political significance because it is a point of first persuasion, a rhetorical 
and political launchpad for a series of upcoming actions including the war on terror and the 
PATRIOT Act. If this speech were to fail, it could spur a cascading domino effect against Bush's 
future proposed policies. Additionally, the physical environment of the speech itself contains 
nonverbal communication that enhances the President's words. During the speech, President 
Bush spoke from a physically elevated position of authority, in the most sacred of American 
political cities, to the most esteemed leaders of American politics, in a regal room. The speech is 
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broadcast nationwide on major television networks, interrupting regular primetime 
programming, which implies that the president's message is extremely important for the public to 
see and hear. The speech is simultaneously presented to both Congress and to the public; both 
Congress and the public react to the speech at the same time. However, because the entire room 
is televised, the public is has a more omnipresent role, because the public can also observe 
members of Congress react to the speech.  
In the second step of metaphoric criticism, the critic selects text(s) for study, and 
identifies all vehicles and correlated tenors in the selected text(s). The vehicle is the way an item 
(or the tenor) is being discussed. The relationship between tenor and vehicle can be one-
directional (the vehicle affects the tenor) or bi-directional, wherein tenor and vehicle are 
“simultaneously entertained” (Sapir, 1977, p.8). Interestingly, the vehicle can be interpreted as 
literal or metaphorical and in these cases, the metaphorical meaning should be considered 
(Richards, 1936). In this study, I identify all metaphor vehicles in President Bush's September 
20, 2001 address, which is arguably Bush's earliest cohesive and official response to 9/11 and 
therefore the foundation of the Bush administration's first major policy response to 9/11. In this 
step Ivie (1987b) recommends using word processing tools to "reduce the original text to an 
abridged version that comprises only marked vehicles and their immediate contexts" (p. 167). 
The text is stripped of everything but its metaphors. 
In Ivie's (1987b) third step, the critic divides the text's metaphors based on their meanings 
(or "similar 'entailments'") into subgroups (p. 167). These subgroups are, arguably, the speaker's  
metaphorical concepts. Each metaphorical concept contributes to the speaker's worldview, 
perspective, or assumptions about the situation at hand; the concepts can portray a person, 
situation, or proposed action; it can compare or classify; and it could connote new meaning. In 
turn these assumptions contribute to the speakers' complete argument and overall persuasive 
power (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Mooji, 1976) 
In the fourth step, the critic expands upon each metaphorical concept. The critic returns to 
the abridged text and goes back through it to identify any additional applications of vehicles that 
contribute to each metaphorical concept. The finished version of each metaphorical concept file 
ideally includes all the speakers' various incarnations of that metaphorical concept.  
Lastly the critic reviews each file of metaphorical concepts one by one. The critic looks 
for patterns of usage both within and between the clusters. The critic prioritizes prevailing 
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patterns and does not focus on outlier vehicles. Outlier vehicles, or vehicles that are not used 
often and not part of any recognizable pattern, may distort the analysis because "the critic may 
have inaccurately assigned a few of the vehicles in each cluster and ... the speaker may have 
drawn upon certain vehicles in isolated instances to meet special purposes" (Ivie, 1987b, p. 168).  
 Once this process is completed, the critic is prepared to assess the speaker’s system of 
metaphors: What do the metaphorical concepts reveal about the speaker's narrative? About the 
speaker's portrayal of the situation, its meaning, and its players? As Ivie (1987b) contends, 
understanding a pattern of vehicles can better direct the critic to the rhetor’s “master metaphors, 
which more often than not are the essential terms” of the speaker's framework (p. 29). 
Artifact 
This analysis reviews the CNN transcript of President George W. Bush's televised 
address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. This speech was chosen because it 
can be reasonably assumed it is the speaker's complete response to the crisis, the speaker's efforts 




Chapter 4 - Analysis 
This chapter explores metaphorical concepts in President George W. Bush's September 
20, 2001 televised address to a joint session of Congress. As the first cohesive publicly mediated 
presidential response to 9/11, this speech is a rhetorical and political landmark event. The 
response President Bush chose to present in this speech would stand as the president's 
perspective of 9/11 and as the official American response. The speech is an example of 
presidential rhetoric, presidential crisis rhetoric and presidential war rhetoric. Metaphors are 
powerful tools of speech that improve a speaker's persuasiveness, and are especially powerful 
tools in war rhetoric. The metaphors presidents choose to use can enhance or hinder their 
policies. The purpose of this metaphoric criticism is to compare President Bush's metaphorical 
concepts to the tenets of prophetic dualism. Prophetic dualism is best revealed and studied 
through figurative speech such as metaphor. If prophetic dualism was used in this speech, the 
first official response to 9/11, this study can reach implications that may be useful for scholars in 
rhetorical studies and political science. 
As I. A. Richards (1936) reminds us, "our pretense to do without metaphor is never more 
than a bluff waiting to be called...we cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid 
discourse without it" (p. 92). Metaphor is embedded in language so deeply and so often that we 
regularly "live by" metaphors without realizing it (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Similarly, President 
Bush's September 20, 2001 address could not avoid metaphor.  His metaphors could arguably 
reveal his underlying narrative of 9/11, and his narrative is a crucial backbone for further 
arguments in favor of war. Which metaphors he chooses to employ, and the meaning of those 
metaphors, is the focus of this analysis.  
This study followed the five-step process outlined by Ivie (1987b). First, using word 
processing equipment, I stripped President Bush's September 20, 2001 address of all terms 
except metaphors and their contexts. I arranged the existing metaphors into groups of similar 
meaning and purpose. Next, each cluster was reviewed against the original transcript and other  
clusters for additional metaphors, cross-referenced metaphors, and supportive clusters. This 
process resulted in the following metaphorical concepts: FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, 
LIGHT/DARK, NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE. Each cluster 
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is discussed in more detail below along with the proposed meaning and extended logical claims 
behind each metaphorical concept. 
 FORCE/WAR 
As Zarefsky (2004b) has argued, President Bush had several options in deciding how to 
interpret - and respond to - 9/11. Bush could have interpreted the events as a crime of horrific 
proportions, or perhaps as an unfortunate lapse in security, but instead, Bush chose to interpret 
9/11 as a call to war. Bush's interpretation is reinforced through metaphors related to the 
concepts of FORCE and WAR.  
The FORCE cluster is comprised of metaphors such as "define," "demands," "track 
down," "pursue," "stop," "eliminate," "destroy," "strike," "act," "lift," "direct," "destruction," 
"defeat," "effort," "rally,"  "unpunished," "unanswered," "hijack," "commands," "dictate," 
"anger," "retreating," "forsaking," "tire, "falter," "fail," "decisive," "conclusion," "retaliation," 
"strikes," "face," "task," "rest," "relent," "waging," "struggle." Metaphors of FORCE imply a 
fight for control. The enemy is trying to exert control over America, and America must 
physically respond in order to maintain its own independence and might: "they stand against us 
because we stand in their way," "the terrorists' directive commands," "we face new and sudden 
challenges," "there are struggles ahead and dangers to face." (Bush, 2001). The enemy would be 
victorious if America relinquishes physical dominance, if "America grows fearful, retreating 
from the world and forsaking our friends," or if America "tire[s]," falter[s]," or "fail[s]."  
As President Bush suggests, the enemy's forcefulness requires the United States to 
respond with equal ferocity for purposes of self-preservation. The U.S. is not the first aggressor, 
but the U.S. will use force as necessary to protect itself: "this country will define our times, not 
be defined by them." "America will act." And the way to protect itself is to destroy the aggressor 
in totality: "if this terror goes unpunished...their own citizens may be next." "Terror unanswered 
can not only bring down buildings..."; "we will pursue nations that provide aid," "track down 
terror," "lift the dark threat of violence," "find them before they strike." In other words, President 
Bush suggests the best defense is a good offense. 
FORCE metaphors and BODY metaphors could be considered personification metaphors 
because they orient action in terms of physical movement. The FORCE cluster is often 
intermingled and reinforced with BODY metaphors. The U.S. will stop at nothing to win, even 
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physical exhaustion: "our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution;" "we face new ... 
challenges," "I will not rest, I will not relent," "we will not tire." FORCE is personalized, 
anthropomorphized, into acts on an individual scale. The FORCE cluster is also reinforced with 
RESOLVE. The battle will be long and the US needs resolve to ensure its success. The battle 
will not be "swift," "decisive," "instant retaliation," or waged through "isolated strikes." The 
nation should prepare for a "lengthy campaign" and its "resolve must not pass." Bush repeats 
"patience," saying "I ask for your patience" and "for your patience in" the battle ahead. 
The WAR cluster refers to the response America will take to 9/11. Metaphors in this 
cluster are "war," "war on terror," "justice," "weapon of war," "defeat," "destruction," "fight," 
"struggle," "conflict," "attacks," "enemies," "under attack," "act of war," "retaliation." Zarefsky 
(2004b) agues President Bush uses metaphors of war in this speech, and this study concurs. Bush 
describes the U.S. foreign policy response to 9/11 as a "war on terror," as "Amerca's fight." 
WAR and FORCE dovetail as similar purposes. In this speech, WAR is the necessary expression 
of FORCE. The United States wages war only because it has been attacked first by an enemy, 
and if the U.S. does not respond with adequate force (in this case, war), the enemy will continue 
to attack. By using "only" when saying "terror unpunished can only bring down buildings," Bush 
implies that there is one realistic solution to terror: to punish it with equal physical strength. 
Bush suggests that no other alternative exists. 
"Justice" emerges as a key metaphor in WAR. "Justice" is Bush's notion for victory; the 
war is over and accomplished when "justice" is achieved. Justice is a metaphor for the victory 
Americans should achieve and deserve to achieve. Bush does not allude to or describe justice in 
terms of legal rights or any form of legal system activity, but rather, as an aggressive, resolute, 
and as a righteous act: “whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, 
justice will be done." The metaphor "justice" is portrayed as a physical thing: It is carried over 
distances and it is something we "bring to" others. This implies a relationship between justice 
and force, both described as items of physicality: perhaps justice is the result of physical force. 
This perspective of the war also helps dissolve any reasonable room for compromise, neutrality 
or any middle ground. Justice is achieved through force and war, not discussion. An implied 
logical extension of this argument is that the enemy is unworthy of compromise and America 
must be victorious over this dangerous inhuman foe by achieving "justice" through physical 
defeat of the enemy, in any physical place necessary. Lastly, justice is portrayed as a core 
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American belief imbued with a religious dimension: "freedom and justice, cruelty and fear, have 
always been at war, and God is not neutral between them" (2001). This statement implies that 
God supports the war, God supports and America, and because God supports the war and 
America, America will be victorious in a war against the enemy. 
Although Ivie's methodology followed here (1987b) discusses metaphor of language, 
Bush also employs visual metaphors of FORCE to a notable degree when he raises a police 
shield in his hand near the end of his speech, displays it before the audience, and states: "And I 
will carry this. It is the police shield of a man named George Howard" (2001). The shield is 
arguably a visual embodiment of FORCE. It could be a form of a metonymy, a type of metaphor 
wherein one object refers to another that is related to it (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The shield can 
be interpreted as metonymy for a variety of subjects. The police shield represents not only the 
single officer who had it, but all police officers, or even the act of policing, of enforcing rules by 
force, of physically "bringing" unlawful people "to justice." The police shield acts as a metaphor 
for Bush's response to 9/11. Bush associates himself with police and policing. Like the police, 
Bush is tasked with bringing the enemy to justice. Furthermore, the police shield may also 
symbolize American values of sacrifice, duty and honor. Bush intentionally includes the context 
when he says George Howard, former owner of the shield, "died at the World Trade Center 
trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. It 
is my reminder of lives that ended and a task that does not end" (2001). In this moment, the 
shield is a visual metaphor that encourages audiences to unite under Bush's leadership, to 
sacrifice themselves to the greater cause of war. The shield simultaneously combines the brute 
FORCE metaphor of "justice" with deeply held American values synonymous with WAR, 
sacrifice, duty, and honor. The shield metaphor coincides with RESOLVE when Bush closes his 
speech with what is arguably his most powerful rhetoric: "I will not forget the wound to our 
country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent in waging this 
struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not 
known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at 
war, and we know that God is not neutral between them" (Bush, 2001). This small section of the 
speech employs every cluster of metaphorical concept, but heavily implies that justice is 
honorable, the war is honorable, and sacrifice is honorable, and that the war should be fought at 
all costs. By displaying his only visual aid in the speech right before stating this section of the 
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text, he re-draws audiences back into the speech. The shield heightens the emotional drama of 
the moment and links that emotion to nearly all of the narrative's metaphorical concepts. 
 BODY 
President Bush refers to the United States and its enemies in terms of the human body. 
BODY metaphors include "wound," "inflicted," "immune," "defensive measures," "protect," 
"grows," "unmarked grave," "forsaking friends," "strengthen us," "face," "stand," "hand over," 
"strike," "tire," "touched," "sing," "comforted." President Bush speaks of America, and of the 
terrorists, as single bodies: "I will not forget the wound to our country and those who inflicted 
it;" "All of America was touched;" "the entire world has seen for itself the state of the union;" 
"we face;" "dangers to face;" "they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history's 
unmarked grave of discarded lies."  
These metaphors create the impression that the United States is a single organism and 
that the terrorist enemies are a separate, distinct single organism. When one extrapolates the 
entailments of this perspective, one can conclude the two opposing forces are wholly separate 
beings with separate minds and intentions. They are whole bodies who can not physically co-
exist in one space. This also underscores a notion that the two sides can not "co-mingle" and 
cannot easily compromise. In particular, these two bodies are mortal enemies, locked in battle to 
the death. Bush uses physical exhaustion metaphors with vivid imagery and repetitive syntax to 
reinforce the decision to stay in the battle at any cost, lest we fall victim to the opposing body. 
“We will not tire, we will not falter, we will not fail … I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not 
relent in waging this struggle for freedom … This is ... a task that does not end.” The repetitive 
syntax of “we will not” also reinforces the UNITY cluster. As a nation, the entire country will 
work beyond physical exhaustion. The BODY cluster is often intermingled with UNITY 
metaphors and GOOD/EVIL metaphors, implying that each side in this battle is like a single 
being, with its own complete soul. For instance, Great Britain is described as a "friend;" and 
America would lose the war on terror if it "forsakes our friends." 
 FEAR 
FEAR is a pervasive metaphoric concept in this artifact. The FEAR cluster includes the 
metaphors "terror," "evil," "fear," "threat," and "fearful." FEAR is America's future if the enemy 
is not defeated: America is on the verge of a new "age of terror;" "it is natural to wonder if 
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America's future is one of fear;" "they...plot evil and destruction;" "trained in the tactics of 
terror;" "they hope America grows fearful."  "Terror" is a key metaphor in this study; it is 
repeated 36 times in various forms ("terror," "terrorist," "terrorists"), more than any other single 
metaphor. "Terror" is a paralyzing, wreaking emotion and is arguably the ultimate form of fear. 
By choosing to call the enemy "terrorists," Bush portrays the enemy as an embodiment of FEAR 
itself. America is to be engaged in a "war on terror;" those who died in 9/11 are described as 
"victims of terror." 
President Bush often juxtaposes FEAR with GOOD/EVIL and FORCE/WAR 
metaphorical concepts, especially the specific metaphors "freedom" and "war." He states, 
"freedom and fear are at war;" "freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war." 
In these statements, "freedom" is positioned as the opposite to FEAR. This repeated 
juxtaposition implies that the enemy produces fear and America produces freedom. These two 
values are diametrically opposed and moreover, cannot coexist; they must engage in war against 
each other necessarily due to their inherent values and meanings. The terrorists naturally would 
wage war against America due their embodiment of FEAR and FEAR's eternal antagonistic 
relationship with "freedom." American must, in turn, return with warfare in order to protect and 
preserve "freedom" from destruction at the hands of FEAR. 
 LIGHT/DARK 
Bush's world of light and dark emerges through the metaphors "night fell," "sent to hide," 
"grave," "discarded," "secret," "track down," "refuge," "tonight," "morning," "died," "dark 
threat," "retreating," "highest level," "watch over," "uphold," "deceived," and "awakened." The 
enemy is connected to metaphors of darkness, and America is correlated with metaphors of 
lightness. This is also an orientational metaphorical concept: light is up and dark is down. The 
enemy is portrayed as hiding out of sight, using the cover of darkness and dark hiding places to 
achieve its aims: "night fell on a different world," where a "dark threat of violence" has covered 
America. Terrorists are "sent to hide in countries" and plot their attacks. By comparison, 
America was attacked "on a peaceful morning," "awakened to danger." As the battle ensues, 
America must "uphold values" while going into a place of darkness to preemptively seek out and 
remove the enemy: "drive [terrorists] from place to place until there is no refuge," "destroy 
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[terrorism] where it grows," "track down terror," and fight any nation that "harbors" or gives 
"safe haven" to terrorists.  
The LIGHT/DARK cluster emphasizes dark metaphors more than light metaphors. The 
enemy and their deeds are often associated with darkness. Also, metaphors of darkness are often 
correlated with SAVAGE metaphors, implying that the enemy is a savage who hides in darkness, 
perhaps because savage beings always reside in places of darkness. Metaphors of lightness are 
usually correlated with metaphors of FAITH like "watch over." War operations will be 
"coordinated at the highest level," and above all, "may God watch over us." This implies that 
America is affiliated with lightness, and America earns its lightness from its leadership but most 
importantly from its faith in God. Also, the metaphors of lightness suggest that America was 
already a country of lightness, values and peace before the enemy struck; that the enemy brings 
its darkness to our shores and around the world. 
 NEAR/FAR 
President Bush employs a pattern of metaphors related to spatial relationships, closeness 
and distance; these metaphors comprise the NEAR/FAR cluster. The NEAR/FAR cluster 
includes "fringe," "extremism," "homeland," "network," "global," "reach," "found," "drive," 
"out," "vast," "retreating," "central," "source," "one," "all," "singled out," "crossed ocean," 
"center," "find," "with," "world."   
The enemy is described as FAR: they are "a fringe form of Islamic extremism," "a fringe 
movement," "a radical network of terrorists." Their goal is to cause more distance between 
themselves and others of different belief; they "want to drive Israel out," "drive Christians and 
Jews out of vast regions." America's war against them will not end until they cannot reach so far, 
until "every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." If the enemy 
wins, America will become FAR: "they hope America grows fearful, retreating from the world."  
The attacks are NEAR: "Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity; they did 
not touch its source." They impacted "homeland security" by attacking "the center of a great city 
on a peaceful morning." America is described as NEAR, and coming closer together as a 
response to 9/11: "We will come together to take active steps." America's allies are also NEAR: 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair "has crossed an ocean to show his unity with America," "we 
are joined together in a great cause." At the center of this "nearness" rests American ideals and 
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the President himself: his administration established "a central source of information" about 
9/11. 
There is no open space or neutrality between who is NEAR and who is FAR: "Either you 
are with us or you are with the terrorists." However, Bush portrays the civilized world as on 
America's side: "An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America's 
side." "We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts." And lastly, Bush portrays that 
eventually, the terrorists will lose and "This will be an age of liberty here and across the world." 
The NEAR/FAR cluster co-mingles with the BODY cluster. The body, one's person, is as close 
as one can be; when America is described as a single body, we are all close to one another; this 
perpetuates a worldview of unity, of united country and a united world. The new leader of 
"homeland security" is a "trusted friend;" "America hs no truer friend than Great Britain." 
 UNITY 
Bush repeats various metaphors that argue that America has united together after 9/11, 
and that America must remain united in the war ahead. These metaphors are grouped in the 
UNITY Cluster. Metaphors include "we," "we've," "union," "we are," "joined together," "all of," 
"America will," "joined," "our," "Americans," "United States of America," "us," "come 
together," "fellow."  
The speech is organized around a series of hypothetical questions which Bush then 
answers. Each question is phrased as a question asked by Americans. Bush states "Americans 
have many questions tonight. Americans are asking, 'Who attacked our country?' ... Americans 
are asking, 'How will we fight and win this war?' ... Americans are asking, 'What is expected of 
us?" In his answers, Bush refers to America as a single entity.  
Bush also speaks directly to America as if it were a single person: "I ask you to live your 
lives;" "I ask you to uphold the values of America;" "I ask you to continue to support the 
victims;" "I ask your continued participation and confidence."  
In this cluster, many metaphors are repeated for extra effect. Bush repeats the phrase "we 
will not forget" three times, preceded by "America will never forget." Bush later repeats "we will 
come together" five times, saying "We will come together to improve air safety;" "We will come 
together to promote stability;" "We will come together to give;" "We will come together to 
strengthen;" "We will come together to take active steps." Not only are America's residents 
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uniting, Bush observes that "Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of the 
Capitol."  
The UNITY cluster also dovetails with the NEAR/FAR cluster. Americans must be 
united, and racial violence or other acts of nationalism are a form of FAR. Americans must not 
treat one another as FAR apart. Americans must remain united: "no one should be singled out for 
unfair treatment or unkind words because of background or religious faith." The UNITY 
metaphoric cluster helps define the “victim” of 9/11 as America; “terrorists attacked America” 
(Sept. 20). Instead of defining the victims literally as those in New York, Pennsylvania and 
Washington, D.C., Bush groups the entire nation together as the victim. Bush also calls on the 
country to remain united in the future. 
 FAITH/FATE 
Metaphors regarding religion, God, and divine power are grouped in the FAITH Cluster. 
President Bush uses metaphors such as "called," "mission," "awakened," "God," "bless," "grace," 
"prayer," "journey," "justice," "rightness," "cause," "grant," "watch over," "hope," "spirit," and 
"victories;" and "blaspheme," "piety," "teachings," and "extremist."  
Bush associates God with America: "God bless America." "may God grant us wisdom 
and may He watch over the United States of America." Bush welcomes "two leaders who 
embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers." Furthermore, Bush's invocations of God 
argue that God is on America's side, and with God's divine support, America is fated to win the 
war on terror: "In our grief and anger we have found our mission;" “Freedom and fear, justice 
and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know God is not neutral between them.” "The 
course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain." "We'll meet violence with patient 
justice, assured of the rightness of our cause."  This association portrays America’s God as a 
militant divine power, supporting His chosen nation. Bush also describes the war itself as a 
mission and calling. “We have found our mission." “Tonight we are a country … called to 
defend freedom." Mission has meaning both as an assigned military act and a call from God to 
serve. The two combined further suggest that God requires the war as a necessary and moral act. 




Bush encourages Americans to continue invoking God through prayer.  Metaphors 
related to prayer suggest that America is best supported through its faith and connection with 
God, specifically the act of prayer. Metaphors frame prayer as a source of strength. We are 
stronger if we pray, and we strengthen others with our prayer. We will heal eventually if we 
"continue praying for the victims" because "grief recedes with time and grace;" "prayer has 
comforted us in sorrow and will help strengthen us for the journey." Conversely, Bush portrays 
the enemy as faithless. If prayer is a source of power, and the enemy rejects faith, the enemy is 
powerless. The terrorists are "a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam;" 
"those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah." "The terrorists are 
traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself." "We're not deceived by their 
pretenses to piety." The enemy is Godless, has rejected God, and therefore lacks the inevitable 
divine strength that comes from prayer and faith. 
Metaphors of FATE reinforce Bush's arguments of FAITH. Metaphors of FATE include 
"follow," "path," "ends," "lies," "before," "journey," "outcome," "course," "neutral," "future," 
"define," "age," "determined." Metaphors of FATE imply that the war is predetermined and the 
outcome is known. This reinforces metaphors of FAITH which claim God supports the war and 
God will help America win the war. The FATE of both the enemy and America is known. The 
enemy "follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. And they follow that path all 
the way to where it ends in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies." "this will not be an age 
of terror. This will be an age of liberty." Thanks to support from God, America's "outcome is 
certain;" "in all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom;" "Prayer ... will help strengthen us 
for the journey ahead." 
 GOOD/EVIL 
 President Bush often uses metaphors for values. These metaphors are grouped into the 
GOOD/EVIL Cluster. Such metaphors are "freedom," "patriot," "friend," "grateful," "values," 
"principles," "cooperation," "give," "decency," "loving," "thanks," "giving," "give," "prosperity," 
"successful," "hard work," "creativity," "enterprise," "strengths," "welcome," "spirit," 
"determined," "strong," "liberty," "rally," "courage," "hope," "normal," "routines," "good," 
"peaceful," "evil," "terror," "hate," "deceived," "pretenses," "traitors," "plot."  
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 Bush metaphorically ascribes America and ally nations as GOOD. America is imbued 
with morally righteous and financially strong qualities. America is a described as a naturally 
peaceful nation. Its moral strengths, combined with its economic power, make it a GOOD nation: 
"America is successful because of the hard work and creativity and enterprise of our people. 
These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11 and those are our strengths 
today." “We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people;” "the United States of 
America is determined and strong." 
 Bush encourages American audiences to continue these qualities of goodness, especially 
of giving, patience, and cooperation:  "the United States is grateful;" "uphold the values of 
America;" "may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it;" "we welcome;" America is 
likely to be victorious in the war on terror in part because of its GOOD attributes: "this will be an 
age of liberty;" "we will rally the world by our efforts, our courage." America is persuaded to 
believe that its culture and values are at risk of destruction. The metaphoric cluster FREEDOM is 
arguably the most important principle at stake.  
In his September 20 speech, Bush said “freedom” 14 times, often using it as a metaphor 
for what must be defended, what was attacked, and how the victim differs from the aggressor: 
“Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom;" "A world where 
freedom itself is under attack" "They hate our freedoms;" "This is the fight of all who believe in 
progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom;" "Freedom and fear are at war." "The advance of 
human freedom – the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time – now 
depends on us.”  
Bush often juxtaposes freedom with fear: “freedom and fear” are “at war."  “Freedom and 
fear...have always been at war.” “They hate our freedoms." This suggests that "freedom" may be 
the most important aspect of GOOD and it is pitted against "fear," the most important aspect of 
EVIL. Bush moralizes the opposing forces throughout his address. By arguing that we are in a 
"war" for our value of "freedom" and we oppose the enemy's value of "fear," Bush moralizes 
both sides of the conflict as shades of "good" and "evil." He defines freedom as America’s most 
important cultural value. It was created and is now possessed by America. Like a valued treasure, 
it is the single thing most at risk of destruction. He argues that terrorists were trying to destroy 
freedom when they attacked America. Bush defines what the war is for, and what we risk losing 
if we are defeated: "We are in a war for our principles."  
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The enemy opposes America's values and its financial might: "Terrorists attacked a 
symbol of American prosperity;" "We're in a fight for our principles;" "Americans are asking, 
'Why do they hate us?'" The terrorists are also associated with negative or EVIL attributes. They 
are "terrorists," invoking terror; they are "traitors," they "plot evil" and "commit evil." They are 
also affiliated with SAVAGE metaphors, and portrayed as lacking FAITH. Bush defines the 
battle as a war on terrorism, or a war on FEAR. The war is not against real people; it is against a 
moral value. This implies that freedom and fear are the two principles that are at war. Bush 
deepens the divide into literal conflict at times, suggesting these two principles exist in a natural 
eternal struggle. Based on this metaphor, one can conclude the enemy must create fear 
specifically by attacking freedom, specifically because the enemy loathes freedom. 
 SAVAGE 
President Bush regularly used certain metaphors to describe the enemy and their actions. 
These metaphors are grouped into the SAVAGE cluster, and include "plot," "evil," "murderers," 
"collection," "turn," "them," "where it grows," "track down," "abetting murder," "training 
camps," "traitors," "their kind," "sacrificing," "abandoning," "regime," "hate," "overthrow." 
President Bush states "Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime" and "they hate us."  
 In a closer scrutiny of the entailments and implied logic of this metaphoric cluster, one 
can see how the enemy is portrayed as the opposite of America. First, by describing the enemy as 
"evil" and "murderers," Bush dehumanizes the enemy. Evil is the utmost negative state of being; 
a person is hardly a person at all if he or she is "evil." This contrasts to the BODY metaphors 
found elsewhere in the text. The United States is a single, unified body, and the enemy is also a 
body, but the enemy is not quite human; it is a savage thing. Second, through the intermingling 
of SAVAGE and FAITH/FATE metaphors, the terrorists are particularly savage because they are 
without faith, godless and valueless. This is in sharp contrast to the United States. “The terrorists 
are traitors to their own faith;" they have “[abandoned] every value except the will to power." 
The underlying implication is that any culture lacking genuine faith is savage. Third, the 
SAVAGE nature of the "evil" enemy is in sharp contrast to America's "civilized" nature: "the 
civilized world is rallying to America's side." "This is the world's fight. This is civilization's 
fight." "They hate our freedoms;" "they stand against us because we stand in their way." These 
metaphors and juxtapositions imply that any savage culture would naturally, and by necessity, 
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hate and oppose a "civilized" culture such as the United States. Fourth, Bush uses LIGHT/DARK 
metaphors to paint a portrait in sharp relief. The enemy is "dark" and America is "light." This 
type of contrast leaves little grey from which to find a middle ground or shared perspective. Last, 
the terrorists' far-flung homes and hideaways contrast against America's open unity and central 
status. In the NEAR/FAR metaphoric cluster, the enemy is FAR and America (and her allies) are 
NEAR. 
President Bush's metaphors illustrate a compelling narrative of peaceful good and far-
flung evil, of civilized freedom and savage fear, forever opposed and now locked in battle to the 
death. His metaphors portray the enemy and America as rightfully and naturally opposed to one 
another. War and force are a natural part of this permanent divide between good and evil; war is 
portrayed as the only reasonable response to the enemy because if America does not go to war, 
the enemy will continue to wage its own brand of fear against America and the rest of the world. 
This argument also implies that compromise with the enemy is simply impossible; the enemy 
wants to destroy America and will oppose freedom at any cost. However, Bush adds that God is 
on America's side, God will grant America a righteous victory, and America is empowered 
through its relationship with God. The enemy, however, does not have divine grace because the 
enemy has chosen to forsake its faith. The enemy does not deserve victory because the enemy's 
actions are evil, and the enemy lacks any redeeming good value. America should go to war to 
defeat the enemy at any cost, while also continuing its path of goodness, by spending money and 
supporting the economy, by having patience, and cooperating with Bush's policies. These are the 
arguments that shine through Bush's metaphorical concepts and it is these arguments which are 
of interest in our conclusions. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Discussion 
President Bush's September 20, 2001 landmark televised address, delivered in response to 
one of the largest attacks on domestic soil in American history, is rich with metaphor about the 
nature of America, the enemy, and action. The metaphorical concepts FORCE/WAR, BODY, 
FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE 
weave a compelling narrative that successfully persuaded the public and the press. Because this 
speech arguably prepared audiences for upcoming policies such as the PATRIOT Act and the 
war on terror as well as a new foreign policy approach called the Bush Doctrine (which also 
framed the Bush administration's justification for the Iraq War), this speech stands as a 
rhetorically and politically significant artifact. Specifically the purpose of this study is to 
determine if Bush's speech fulfills the tenets of prophetic dualism, a unique foreign policy 
framework with political and rhetorical implications for anyone who chooses to use it. Prophetic 
dualism can be revealed through a study of metaphor, and the metaphorical concepts found in 
this speech are now ready to be compared to prophetic dualism. This study generates rhetorical 
implications regarding presidential rhetoric, the modern rhetorical presidency, presidential crisis 
rhetoric, presidential war rhetoric, civil religion and prophetic dualism. Due to the nature of 
prophetic dualism itself, this study also generates practical implications that may be of interest to 
political science scholars, as well as practical implications of the president's decision to use war 
rhetoric, crisis rhetoric and civil religion as responses to 9/11. Methodologically, this study 
suggests implications for metaphoric criticism and metaphorical concepts.  
Rhetorical Implications 
 The purpose of this study was to explore how, if at all, President Bush's September 20, 
2001 address stands as an example of prophetic dualism. In order to reach that conclusion, this 
study explored President Bush's speech within current scholarly understanding of presidential 
rhetoric, presidential crisis rhetoric and war rhetoric. This study finds that President Bush's 
speech fits the tenets of the modern rhetorical presidency and presidential crisis rhetoric, though 
it may not fit all characteristics of presidential war rhetoric. Finally, President Bush's speech 
illustrates all major tenets of civil religion and prophetic dualism.  
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Tulis' (1987) notion of the modern rhetorical presidency seems to be reflected in this 
artifact, as it has been in many others; this speech could stand as an example of presidents who 
have appeal directly to the public. In this setting, in a joint session to Congress, President Bush 
both literally and figuratively speaks "over the heads of Congress." He speaks through 
teleprompters to television cameras and to families watching in their homes after dinner. He 
implies war as a necessary, natural response to the situation (the narrative), although Congress 
(not the public) must vote whether or not to support war. Members of Congress were hearing the 
speech at the same time as the public, but they were not given the luxury of expressing their true 
feelings; any wayward facial expression could be captured on cameras and misinterpreted by 
millions of people. After the speech, if Members of Congress wanted to express disagreement 
with Bush's proposals, they would have had to directly oppose public support of the speech while 
simultaneously presenting their own alternative viewpoints. Considering that the public's and the 
press' reaction to the speech were positive, one has to wonder if Members of Congress stood a 
reasonable chance of persuasively opposing Bush's narrative or the policies which emerged from 
his narrative, or even of putting their own chances of reelection at risk if they were to publicly 
oppose his narrative and policies. 
This study supports current understanding of presidential crisis rhetoric. Crisis rhetoric 
must state the facts of the crisis, establish a melodrama of "good" and "evil," and present a policy 
solution to the crisis. The solution must be presented by the president and it should be framed as 
a moral act (Kuypers, 1997, p. 18). This speech appears to meet all these tenets. Bush's 
metaphorical concepts created a dichotomy of "good" and "evil," and presented these two sides 
in terms of their morals - their faiths. The president's proposed solution - to eradicate evil - is 
posited as a moral act. President Bush responded with justificatory crisis rhetoric, wherein he 
called for military action against terrorists, a vigilant war against terror, and declared the 
terrorists evil foes. 9/11 was perceived to be a large-scale and significant national crisis, and this 
speech seemed to confront the nation's fears. His September 20, 2001 address may have provided 
a decisive response that the public sought; it was widely watched and positively received.  
 This speech is a good example of all but one of the tenets of presidential war rhetoric. 
Typically, five arguments codify presidential war rhetoric (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). The 
first characteristic is a dramatized narrative of the situation. Cutting away the details, a speech 
summarizes what seem to be the most important aspects of a situation, boiling a complex 
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situation to its core narrative of "what happened." Similarly, President Bush's September 20, 
2001 speech is structured around a series of hypothetical questions about 9/11. The speech seeks 
to answer the most common questions about 9/11. The questions focus attention around basic 
elements of the narrative, such as "who attacked us," and "what should we do." President Bush 
defines the events surrounding 9/11 and creates a framework for defining the victim, the enemy 
and the attacks. He prescribes a proper reaction to the crisis (war) and he instructs Americans to 
unite and remain resolved and patient for upcoming actions.  
The second characteristic of war rhetoric is a "strategic misrepresentation" of the 
narrative (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 118). While the narrative is a "story" of the situation, 
the strategic misrepresentation refers to the compelling and persuasive elements that draw in the 
audience and lend support to the president as commander in chief. Typically, this portrays the 
enemy as an aggressor, pits the enemy against the nation's most cherished values, and positions 
the president's proposed actions as the best means of defense. Similarly, President Bush 
establishes a compelling narrative rich vivid imagery. The enemy is one who, by virtue of his 
sheer lack of faith, hates America and in particular, America's freedoms (as some have argued, 
economic freedoms). The enemy will stop at nothing to destroy others around the world and it 
will always seek to destroy America because America "stands in [its] way" (Bush, 2001). 
Therefore, because of this situation, Bush's proposal aims to seek out and destroy the enemy. 
This policy proposal - war - is presented as a morally correct solution and more specifically as 
the only possible solution. If the narrative were true, there would be no reasonable alternative 
other than to confront and preemptively destroy the enemy, before the enemy will attack again. 
One can argue that each of these claims seem overly simplistic when examined on their own (for 
example, one could ask how an enemy can "hate our freedoms"), but each claim is persuasive 
nonetheless. President Bush succeeds at strategically misrepresenting the situation. Any 
"misrepresented" aspect dovetails with other aspects of the situation. President Bush ultimately 
blends each aspect of the situation, tightly weaving a cohesive narrative that, overall, is 
powerfully persuasive. 
A third tenet of war rhetoric occurs when the speaker claims that the decision to go to 
war was achieved through careful deliberation (Campbell and Jamieson, 1990). Based on the 
analysis, President Bush arguably did not fulfill this tenet of presidential war rhetoric in this 
artifact. Bush never claims that he carefully deliberated war; instead, he bluntly calls for 
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immediate, forceful action. For instance, he states "America must act" because "terror 
unanswered can only bring down buildings." Bush states America is not a war-faring nation. He 
claims that America is a "peaceful" nation and he implies that America does not seek out war. 
But this is not quite the same as saying that he deliberated his decision to call for war. He does 
not imply, but instead directly states that America should go to war when provoked. 
Additionally, he declares that the nation's "grief has [turned into] resolve." He transforms grief 
into acceptance and action. Perhaps the "grief/resolve" metaphor implies that the pain and fear 
caused by the tragedy is reason itself to go to war; no exacting logic or careful calculation is 
needed. There are several possible explanations behind this finding. First, perhaps this particular 
rhetorical situation did not require this tenet of war rhetoric; the events of 9/11 were so jarring 
that the public would not want careful deliberation. Second, this study may reinforce the work 
done by Hart and Childers (2004), who found that Bush resurrected and increasingly used verbal 
certainty, or resolute language, during first 1,000 days in office in his second term, and verbal 
certainty operates in direct opposition to careful deliberation. President Bush was not the kind of 
person who "carefully deliberated." Lastly, this particular tenet of war rhetoric is contrary to the 
rhetorical constructs of prophetic dualism. If a rhetor utilizes prophetic dualism, the rhetor may 
abandon this tenet of war rhetoric as an incongruous element. The fact that this tenet is less 
pronounced in this speech may offer some justification that this artifact is an example of 
prophetic dualism.   
A fourth tenet of war rhetoric occurs when the speaker seeks to unify the audience in 
preparation for battles ahead (Campbell and Jamieson, 1990). Similarly, Bush's UNITY 
metaphors strive repeatedly throughout the speech to express unity, call for unity, and 
demonstrate unity. He speaks of America as "us," "we," "our," as if the nation is a single group; 
even Republicans and Democrats in Congress are "joined together." The last remaining tenet of 
war rhetoric occurs when the speaker portrays him/herself as the leader, the Commander in Chief 
who is fully capable and ready to accept the heavy mantle of war. Bush may be enacting this 
tenet when he speaks directly to the audience from an I/you perspective. He commands the 
nation four times with the phrase "I ask you [to]," as his own response to a question he posits: 
"Americans are asking, 'What is expected of us?'" The police shield also reinforces Bush as 
commander in chief. Because he "carries" the shield with him as a "reminder" of all the shield 
symbolizes, he holds near the "common man." This implies that he is not regularly tied to the 
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common man; that he is apart from the public. He chooses to bring this singular aspect of the 
public close to him perhaps because it represents who he is and his leadership, or it represents the 
narrative of the situation, or it represents American values (or all of the above). Bush positions 
himself as the commander in chief, giving the first cohesive answers, leading and directing 
Americans to act in certain ways for the good of the nation. Overall, President Bush's speech 
seems to meet all the tenets of war rhetoric except in the case of demonstrating that the decision 
to go to war was carefully debated and weighed.  
 These conclusions lead to three important questions for further research on the nature of 
crisis rhetoric and war rhetoric. First, this study questions whether crisis rhetoric should not be 
overly compartmentalized and categorized. As this situation indicates, on occasion, crisis 
rhetoric may warrant unique patterns of rhetorical action which are not fully reflected in the 
current literature. Some forms of crisis rhetoric, such as the artifact in this study, respond to 
actual physical attacks on home soil and attacks from non-nations, such as ethnic groups or 
religious groups. Rhetorical situations with a non-national enemy may require a different form of 
war rhetoric and crisis rhetoric. Second, this study raises questions for a potential sub-genre of 
war rhetoric or crisis rhetoric called "anticipatory rhetoric," or rhetoric which establishes a 
perceived need for prolonged, pervasive military response. As in this study, rhetors may use 
different tactics for preparing audiences to accept continuous wars (such as the war on terror), 
such as defining the enemy differently or presenting U.S. intentions differently. Critics can 
explore how rhetors prepare their audiences for continuous war, if at all. Perhaps, by comparison, 
rhetors cannot truly prepare their audiences for continuous war, as subsequent anti-war 
sentiments against the Iraq War and Vietnam War have indicated. This area is worthy of further 
discussion. Last, this study raises the issue of "proportionality." Perhaps President Bush's 
response to 9/11 was not proportional to the rhetorical situation. The events of 9/11 were 
horrendous acts of violence, but perhaps they did they warrant one of the longest prolonged wars 
in United States history. This is interesting because Bush's speech was received with glowing 
support in the immediate aftermath, but as the war extended from months to years, and anti-war 
sentiments expanded, perhaps Bush's initial response was an inaccurate policy response. It 
successfully galvanized public opinion and was emotionally received, but perhaps the long-term 
implications of the policies that were promoted in the speech were not as well received. This 
leads to further implications for anyone who uses prophetic dualism as justification for 
71 
 
prolonged war. Perhaps prophetic dualism does not work if the enemy is not defined (as in the 
case of the war on terror) or the image of victory is not apparent. 
The next area of study, civil religion, recalls the first research question: How, if at all, is 
civil religion present in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address? Civil religious rhetoric 
summons ages-old notions of right and wrong and it is these notions upon which a society bases 
its moral values (Bellah, 1970). Civil religious rhetoric is a powerfully persuasive tool for uniting 
a people via shared values to shared perspectives and goals. It reasserts long-held values and 
reorients us under a shared framework. Civil religious rhetoric typically communicates four 
beliefs: There is a God; God's will is known and enacted through government; America is God's 
agent; and citizens should identify with their country in a religious sense (Pierard & Linder, 
1998). Because God's will is enacted through government, presidents reign as de facto "high 
priests" of American civil religion, imbued with the authority to declare American beliefs and 
unify the nation through them (Pierard and Lindner, 1988, p. 25).  
In his September 20, 2001 speech, President Bush invoked Pierard and Lindner's (1988) 
four characteristics of civil religion. President Bush’s use of civil religion is widespread in the 
artifact and is most often exemplified through the FAITH/FATE metaphorical concept. First, 
Bush implies there is a God when he refers to God directly, as in "God bless America." He also 
implies that America is God's agent and God's chosen nation. For instance, he states "may God 
grant us wisdom and may He watch over the United States of America." This suggests that God 
devotes His attention and wisdom to America, and that America receives protection through 
God. Second, through metaphors of FAITH and FATE, Bush implies that God's will is known 
and enacted through the government. For example, when he states, "In our grief and anger we 
have found our mission," he implies with the metaphor "mission" ("mission" is also a term for 
religious journeys that have been taken in order to serve God, or journeys that God asks His 
subjects to take) that the act of going to war is a directive from God. God's will is known (the 
mission is God's will) and God's will is fulfilled through enactment of the mission. Third, 
President Bush implies that America is God's chosen agent. For example, Bush suggests that 
with help from God, America is destined for victory: "The course of this conflict is not known, 
yet its outcome is certain." "We'll meet violence with patient justice, assured of the rightness of 
our cause." These metaphors imply that America is assured victory because its cause is 
"righteous," or Godly. Additionally, President Bush suggests that God supports America 
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specifically because America is the harbinger of freedom and justice: “Freedom and fear, justice 
and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know God is not neutral between them.” Lastly, 
President Bush fulfills the final remaining tenet of civil religion, that Americans should identify 
with their nation in a religious sense. Not only do all preceding tenets of civil religion generate a 
stronger affiliation between religious values and nation (for example, the U.S. is enacting a 
"mission" which is a "righteous cause"), Bush also encourages Americans to take action in 
support of the war on terror by praying: "continue praying for the victims;" "prayer has 
comforted us in sorrow and will help strengthen us." Prayer will help fulfill the mission ahead. 
He implies that, with God's help, the nation can move forward: "grief recedes with time and 
grace." These statements suggest that prayer invites grace from God, and this grace is both 
healing and empowering. 
 The logical extensions of Bush's FAITH/FATE metaphorical concepts generate several 
conclusions about his larger worldview. During this time of intense national crisis and 
widespread fear, civil religion offered a form of eulogy, a source for American unity, and 
mortification: through our prayer with God, we could mourn and move on. We could reknit as a 
community through our shared faith in God and our faith in the semi-religious American values 
of freedom and justice. God's will is to protect freedom and justice, the core values of America, 
for all eternity. The God that President Bush recalls is soothing yet militant. This God is 
committed to righting wrongs that have been committed against His faithful followers; justice is 
"righteous," and war is a "calling" and a "mission;" the way "calling" and "mission" are used, 
they could imply that they come from God because Bush declares the entire nation is "called" to 
go to war; there must be an outside force that calls President Bush and the nation to act. 
Similarly, Bush positions patriotism as both a means of healing and war. Through civil religion – 
through God and Country – we can find our better selves, recover emotionally from our fears, 
and move on. We are encouraged to adopt this worldview in order to overcome our grief and 
fear. Patriotism is a reason for sacrifice and war. As Marvin (2002) reminds us, patriotism carries 
a Godliness; like God, patriotism is imbued with authority to declare life or death to loyal 
patriots or to traitors, and carries authority to demand sacrifice of a loyal nation.  
The next research question is: "Is prophetic dualism evident in President Bush's 
September 20, 2001 address?" From the extrapolated arguments and meanings entailed in Bush's 
metaphorical concepts, discussed in Chapter Four, this study concludes that the proposed 
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worldview in this artifact correlates with the tenets of prophetic dualism. In understanding how 
the artifact stands as an example of prophetic dualism, we approach the last research question: 
What, if any, metaphors did President Bush use to establish a framework of prophetic dualism? 
It is through metaphor that I will see how Bush evokes prophetic dualism; both questions are 
simultaneously explored here in more detail. 
The first characteristic of prophetic dualism occurs when a speaker encourages audiences 
to choose between good and evil. Prophetic dualism posits a worldview of direct life-and-death 
struggle between two eternally opposed foes. The division between these two camps is based on 
values; each side's distinct morals and values lead to their natural and irrevocable split. Because 
their values are opposed, the two sides are also, naturally, opposed to one another. The speaker 
associates the "good" side with religious faith, a militant God, and freedom. The "evil" side is in 
direct moral opposition to "good;" it is the opposite of whatever "good" may be. Similarly, 
President Bush establishes a GOOD/EVIL metaphorical concept wherein America is "good" and 
the enemy is "evil." America's goodness has been earned and is exemplified through its values of  
freedom and justice, its peacefulness, its economy, its unity, and its faith in God. The enemy is 
presented as "evil;" they hides in dark places, comprise a loose network on the fringes of the 
world. Not only have they abandoned their faith, they are traitors to Allah. In this metaphorical 
construct, "good" is imbued with Godliness, prayer, economic might and unity. "Evil" is 
godlessness, darkness, a dissipated people, traitorousness, and fear itself. President Bush's 
metaphorical clusters work together to portray two naturally, diametrically opposed forces. 
Combined with the NEAR/FAR cluster and the FORCE/WAR cluster, the GOOD/EVIL cluster 
positions America squarely, permanently, and utterly opposed to the “evil” enemy. The 
LIGHT/DARK cluster further details the ways in which America and the enemy are naturally 
opposed: America is light and up, the enemy is dark and down. "Night fell on a different world," 
America has been "awakened to danger" and must "uphold values" by "lifting a dark threat of 
danger," "track down terror," and "destroy it where it grows." Although the enemy resides far 
away in hidden places, Bush implies that it will continue to strike out against America and the 
world because it hates America's freedom, it hates America's strength, and it will always look for 
ways to harm America. Furthermore, Bush's metaphors imply that America could never become 
like the enemy; the enemy is the opposite of America in every meaningful way. In fact the 
enemy is hardly human; through SAVAGE metaphors, Bush portrays the enemy as a sub-human 
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embodiment of fear itself, destined for an "unmarked grave." Based on this narrative of the 
situation, a rational, logical action would be to oppose the enemy at all costs, and to battle them 
immediately, before they could strike again (and according to this narrative, they will, because 
they "plot evil").  This tenet of prophetic dualism argues that the "good" side must oppose and 
battle the "evil" side in order to fulfill God's will. God's will is known, and God commands 
America to oppose the enemy. As discussed in the preceding section on civil religion, President 
Bush's metaphors fulfill this sub-tenet as well. Bush implies that God's will is known and God's 
will is to fight the enemy. Justice is "righteous," and war is a "calling" and a "mission" from our 
higher power. 
The second tenet of prophetic dualism is an absence of public dissent. The religious 
dimension of prophetic dualism's worldview allows a logical extension of Wander's (1984) 
assertion that God closes out debate: If America is "good" and its people are "good," then they 
have faith in God. A "good" American can't argue against God's will, and God's will is to battle 
the enemy at any cost. Anyone who opposes the war in any form, including questioning it or 
engaging in debate, is "not good." Therefore, Americans must support the war. The sort of 
national pride and self-sacrifice resultant from prophetic dualism is pervasive, deeply felt, and 
long lasting. A speaker utilizing prophetic dualism doesn't advocate just for patriotism, but for 
absolute support. Looking at the speech's metaphorical concepts, one finds many instances where 
the speaker subtly argues against dissent. Although President Bush rarely discourages dissent 
outright or literally, directly says "do not disagree with one another," he places relatively 
significant time and effort encouraging unity, which could be interpreted as the opposite of 
dissent. More than any other metaphoric cluster, he repeats UNITY. The speech contains several 
instances of repetition, and in these cases, Bush is repeating terms of UNITY. For instance he 
repeats the phrase "we will come together" five times in rapid succession, reinforcing the point 
and creating stronger, more persuasive and lasting imagery in the minds of his audience. Not 
only is the country united, it is united in ideology: "Republicans and Democrats joined together 
on the steps of the Capitol." Extending the logic of the UNITY cluster, one can argue President 
Bush is discouraging debate. If "we come together," we are less likely to disagree and debate 
policy issues. To "come together" is to act as one, to be of one mind; and if a group is united, the 
group does not debate issues internally. Bush also creates visual imagery of the nation "as one" 
through BODY metaphors. The nation is presented as a single body of flesh which has been 
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wounded and is not immune from attack: "I will not forget the wound to our country and those 
who inflicted it." The body must take defensive measures for protection. By logical extension, 
this argument implies that defensive measures will not protect all areas of the "body" if the 
"body" splinters into factions. Portraying the country as a single body allows for more vivid 
imagery and persuasive potency; we are figuratively one being, and a being only has one mind 
with which to think, and one course of action. Bush combines UNITY with FORCE/WAR and 
FAITH/FATE to reiterate that God plays a pivotal role in our unity. God (and his people) oppose 
the enemy, and will always do so: "freedom and justice, cruelty and fear, have always been at 
war, and God is not neutral between them." If the "good" audience follows God's will, the 
audience must unite together behind God's mission and therefore the audience must, as one 
nation under God, follow the proposed course of action. This further implies that anyone who 
opposes the war actually opposes God's will. 
The final characteristic of prophetic dualism is the belief that compromise and neutrality 
are unacceptable; they equivalent to surrender and failure. The nation must fight and must win 
because neither failure nor neutrality are acceptable. President Bush's speech repeatedly implies 
or directly states a similar perspective, advocating against compromise for a variety of reasons. 
First, through metaphors of FORCE/WAR, Bush declares that if America fails to act, the enemy 
wins: if "America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends" and "if 
terror goes unpunished ... [Afghanistan's] own citizens may be next." To not strike the enemy 
would be tantamount to failure. Bush combines FORCE/WAR with metaphors of RESOLVE, 
encouraging the public to prepare for a long and challenging road ahead, a "lengthy campaign," 
that requires "patience" and "resolve." The war may be challenging, but any other path would not 
work; therefore, the public must stay committed to the challenge. Bush also employs metaphors 
of BODY to reiterate RESOLVE: "I will not rest, I will not relent;" "we will not tire, we will not 
falter, we will not fail." These metaphors could be used interchangeably and are presented as 
equivalent terms: to relent is to rest; to rest is to falter; to falter is to fail. By logical extension, to 
relent is to fail. Lastly, Bush employs metaphors of NEAR/FAR to imply that there is no open 
space or neutrality between America and the enemy. The enemy, who is FAR, brought the 
attacks (as well as FEAR) NEAR; we "face dangers." However, there is a gap in space between 
NEAR and FAR that cannot be occupied: "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists;" 
"the civilized world is rallying to America's side." This further perpetuates an underlying 
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argument that neutrality, common ground, compromise, appeasement and discussions are 
logically impossible. If Bush's metaphors are accepted as truth, then by logical extension, 
neutrality and compromise are not only unreasonable, they are dangerous, because the savage 
enemy will surely attack if allowed any leeway.  
President Bush's September 20, 2001 speech is a reflection of the modern rhetorical 
presidency and justificatory crisis rhetoric, prophetic dualism and civil religion, but it is an 
unusual example of presidential war rhetoric. Perhaps this artifact could not fulfill all tenets of 
war rhetoric because prophetic dualism, present in this artifact, runs in direct opposition to one 
characteristic of traditional war rhetoric: careful deliberation. If this artifact is an example of 
prophetic dualism, the artifact is also subject to a series of political implications that correlate 
with prophetic dualism. This particular locus of study may further reinforce the genre's known 
implications. 
Political Implications 
President Bush’s rhetoric served a crucial role in the aftermath of 9/11. The public was 
seized in fear, experiencing a crisis on massive scale. The public needed his leadership, and he 
needed to calm the public and to recommend future course of action. Based on the public and 
press' positive reactions to his September 20, 2001 address, one can conclude that the speech 
successfully confronted the crisis and directed the country toward a resolution. This study finds 
that Bush's speech fits the tenets of prophetic dualism, suggesting that prophetic dualism may 
have repeatedly existed as part of Bush's rhetorical patterns from the beginning of 9/11 until (at 
least) the Iraq War. However, by utilizing prophetic dualism well into his second term, Bush may 
have perpetuated the crisis as much as he abated it. The metaphorical concept of FEAR is a 
worldview framework from which to perpetuate and summon feelings of fear for persuasive 
purposes. By constantly reminding audiences of the negative feelings associated with 9/11, of 
recalling the FEAR metaphorical concept - by establishing the war on terror and using the word 
"terrorism" extensively in future rhetoric - he could recall the sensations we know to be 
associated with crisis, specifically of some external threat to one's personhood or home. This 
conclusion is consistent with other research which concludes that Bush extended crisis rhetoric 
from 9/11 through the summer of 2002 through heavy and repeated references to "evil," 9/11, 
and external threats (John, Domke, Coe and Graham, 2007). The pattern of FEAR began 
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immediately after 9/11, as this study suggests, aided by a prophetic dualism framework which 
emphasizes the enemy's negative attributes and threatening actions. 
Wander (1984) proposed two practical implications to prophetic dualism. First, prophetic 
dualism may "allow" or exacerbate nationalism. If a war is a life or death struggle and the enemy 
is truly "evil," the public may perceive that a nationalistic approach may be acceptable: If the 
enemy is "evil," it therefore seems reasonable to treat the enemy as a savage being, a traitor to 
God, and "evil." This study finds numerous instances where President Bush portrays the enemy 
as EVIL and SAVAGE, which fits Wander's requirements for this practical implication to be 
fulfilled, and this study also finds numerous instances of nationalistic behavior among American 
political leaders, the media and the public after 9/11. This study does not necessarily prove a 
correlation between President Bush's prophetic dualism and subsequent acts of nationalism in the 
U.S., but based on Wander's assertions, it is possible that a correlation could exist. In his speech, 
President Bush discourages hate crimes by asking the public not to "single out" anyone for their 
faith, but in the months following 9/11, hate crimes against Arab Americans and Muslim 
Americans continued (Akram & Johnson, 2002).  
Wander's (1984) second political implication asserts that if a speaker publicly banishes 
neutrality and compromise, the speaker puts him or herself at a policymaking disadvantage in 
two ways. First, if the speaker's narrative is accepted as literally true, the nation must pay any 
cost, no matter how high, to defeat the enemy. If the public perceives those costs to be too high, 
this creates a fissure in the logic of a prophetic dualism narrative because prophetic dualism 
asserts that absolute victory must be achieved at any cost, no matter how unpopular or 
challenging. From a foreign policy perspective, the rhetor faces increasingly difficult challenges 
to maintain the logic of a prophetic dualism worldview if the public perceives the costs of war to 
be too high. The second policymaking disadvantage occurs when (or if) the political situation 
evolves into a valid opportunity for neutrality or compromise. If this happens, the speaker again 
faces significant hurdles in persuading the public to accept this divergent course of action. The 
public has already accepted a worldview that strictly defines neutrality as failure. When 
comparing Wander's assertions to this study of President Bush's use of prophetic dualism and 
other scholarly research of President Bush's Iraq War rhetoric, one can arguably identify these 
implications of prophetic dualism in the political realm. Public debate and discussion of ending 
or scaling down U.S. troop presence in the war on terror and the Iraq War (which could be 
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interpreted as "neutrality" or "compromise" in the war on terror and the Iraq War) have been 
controversial and hotly debated political topics. The country's worldview has remained 
"shriveled," "rigid," "impudent" and "impervious to countervailing experiences and 
disconfirming consequences" (Ivie, 2007b, p. 222). This could lend credence to Wander's 
assertions about the political implications of prophetic dualism. Perhaps if President Bush had 
used another approach to explaining 9/11, for instance as a terrible crime or lapse in national 
security, the nation would not accepted a long-term commitment to fighting wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
This leads us to a potentially interesting interplay between presidential war rhetoric and 
prophetic dualism. A characteristic of war rhetoric involves a speaker's claim that he or she 
carefully deliberated the decision to go to war. Throughout American history, presidents have 
repeatedly included this claim when declaring war (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). However, 
prophetic dualism short-circuits deliberation, both in the speaker's narrative and, arguably, in the 
public's response. Any speaker who uses prophetic dualism to declare war will likely not fulfill 
this particular tenet of presidential war rhetoric. Not only does this lead scholars to consider this 
and possibly other caveats in presidential war rhetoric research, this leads a scholar to consider 
the practical implications of a war that is not carefully deliberated. Perhaps, in this situation and 
other high-conflict scenarios such as the Cold War and its ever-present fear of nuclear 
annihilation, this tenet of presidential war rhetoric was not necessary because the nation believed 
war was necessary. The public didn't need reassurance that there could have existed a slim 
chance that war wasn't necessary, and careful deliberation had weighed war as requisite. 
However, in situations without a palpable public crisis, a quick decision could be perceived as 
brash or reckless. Perhaps if President Bush had not adopted prophetic dualism and instead had 
fulfilled all tenets of war rhetoric - if he had demonstrated that the choice to go to war had been a 
deliberative, carefully weighed decision - this may have led to a different narrative of the 
situation that would have been less "rigid" and, possibly, this could have resulted in different 
foreign policy outcomes. Lastly, if a president declares he or she conducts deliberative action, it 
implies that deliberation is a proper mode of action; ergo, deliberation leads to good action. A 
resolute action implies that deliberation is unnecessary, or perhaps foolish. If President Bush had 
portrayed the decision to go to war as carefully deliberated, instead of a "righteous cause," a 
"mission" or a "calling," the narrative could have remained somewhat more flexible, and that 
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flexibility could have left more room for more debate and deliberation about the nature and 
timing of conclusion to the war on terror and, possibly, the Iraq War. 
This study finds that a prophetic dualism narrative may also generate foreign policy 
implications for victory and peace. A prophetic dualism worldview asserts that the enemy is pure 
evil and should not exist. Therefore, by logical extension, victory realistically translates to 
complete annihilation of the enemy - or annihilation of the enemy's beliefs.  Prophetic dualism's 
stated goal is to fight the enemy's values because the enemy is "evil," but in the real world, an 
enemy's beliefs are not eradicated by force (aside from total genocide). History tends to show 
that it is impossible to change an enemy's beliefs through sheer force, and Americans don't seem 
to accept the alternative, genocide, as a "good" value. If the enemy can't be eradicated and the 
enemy's beliefs can't be forcibly changed, then according to the narrative of prophetic dualism, 
there is no victory and no peace. Prophetic dualism is possibly a "no win" scenario because if 
one literally follows the rules of prophetic dualism, peace is unattainable. Furthermore, a 
scenario for future peace, along with any entailments and imagery, is conspicuously absent in the 
prophetic dualism framework. In President Bush's narrative, peace is absent for now and possibly 
for all eternity because "freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war." 
Prophetic dualism's narrow definitions of enemy and justice leave no room for a post-war world. 
Considering that future presidents may continue this narrative because the narrative has become 
part of the national agenda, and the fact that this narrative does not offer a "conclusion" to war, 
this study suggests that any president who wishes to conclude a war that started with prophetic 
dualism might best be served by actively abandoning the prophetic dualism narrative. It is not 
enough to finish the narrative by declaring "Mission Accomplished" within the prophetic 
dualism framework, as President Bush attempted to do in 2003, nearly a decade before the U.S. 
announced it would begin scaling down U.S. troop involvement in Iraq. Presidents who seek to 
end war should publicly reject the narrative of prophetic dualism as unrealistic, construct a new 
narrative that contains imagery and supporting archetypes that portray a conclusion to conflict, 
and shift the national agenda to policies that reflect the new narrative. The possibility of enacting 
a new narrative around 9/11, however, seems to be a daunting task in the face of the 
"determinative force" in presidential rhetoric (Hart, 2006). If a president introduces a bold new 
policy, or a new course of action, the rhetoric of that policy remains a part of the national agenda 
long after that president's term has concluded. Bush firmly established the "war on terrorism" in 
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the national agenda; it has become an unavoidable topic and is something national political 
leaders have continued to discuss, often regardless of other national issues or the leaders' own 
priorities (John, Domke, Coe and Graham, 2007; Bostdorff, 2009). While any president seeking 
peace could attempt to abandon Bush's narrative of 9/11 in favor of a new one that is inclusive of 
closure and peace, a new narrative may pale in prophetic dualism's shadow.  
 This study also raises a question regarding the social context of prophetic dualism. 
Prophetic dualism may be situational; it may require certain conditions to pre-exist in the 
rhetorical situation. Prophetic dualism is a moral framework that reinforces and justifies specific 
foreign policy actions. But it may be possible that other domestic social conditions, beyond a 
shared orientational metaphor, might be necessary for prophetic dualism to successfully shape 
foreign policy. In scholarly research, rhetorically successful instances of prophetic dualism 
emerge from only two foreign policy events, the Cold War and the Iraq War. At first glance, both 
events carry similar domestic conditions. This includes widespread public fear of immediate and 
severe bodily harm; a foreign foe with different religious faith; a desire on the part of the 
president to preempt danger; and a seeming lack of self-evident or beneficial compromise. 
Further research regarding the social contexts of prophetic dualism are worth exploration.  
The practical implications of prophetic dualism imply a frightening future of war without 
end. Prophetic dualism constructs a specific narrative of war and enemy that America seems to 
have accepted and, more than a decade later, continues to reflect. Perhaps some in the United 
States remain dedicated to war (and to the sacrifices entailed with war, including loss of life and 
civil liberties) because this scenario was first defined - to the public and to Congress - as the only 
logical response to 9/11. Without another narrative of 9/11 to replace prophetic dualism, 
America may remain committed to this path in perpetuity, or at least until this issue falls from 
the national agenda. However, prophetic dualism requires more research. It may require specific 
conditions to exist if it is to persuade audiences effectively. 
Methodological Implications 
 The critical analysis in Chapter Four raises several methodological considerations. The 
process of  studying metaphor in this artifact - and the decision to follow Ivie's (1987b) process 
to study metaphor - has proven an insightful means for uncovering layers of argument within 
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Bush's speech. It has also generated further questions and potential implications in the areas of 
visual and textual metaphor, archetypal metaphor, and orientational metaphor.  
In this artifact, metaphor appears to be "the linguistic origin" of many arguments (Ivie, 
1982, p. 240), and metaphorical criticism proved a useful technique for rooting out the 
underlying worldview that knits those arguments together. This study unearthed specific 
meanings, area of emphasis, and extrapolated logic through an examination of metaphors in 
President Bush's speech. Ivie's technique of locating and extract metaphors (and their contexts) 
from the original text and then dividing them into areas of related meanings proved an efficient 
process that clarified metaphors and helped reveal patterns of metaphor across the full text. 
However, Ivie's approach seems to focus on textual metaphors and therefore does not take into 
account visual metaphors. Because the intention of this study was to focus primarily on textual 
metaphors, this approach serves the purpose of this study. However, a metaphoric criticism that 
includes visual metaphors may have also functioned in this artifact because this artifact 
contained a vivid moment of visual metaphor - when President Bush held aloft the police shield 
of a man who died in the World Trade Center - and this artifact was set in a visually significant 
place, and also televised to audiences (both seen and heard). One can argue this speech was 
meant to be both seen and heard, thus making it worth scholarly review in a visual context. 
Though this criticism functioned offered a useful lens for investigating the rhetor's underlying 
beliefs and overarching narrative, perhaps future research of President Bush's nonverbal 
communication is worth exploring.  
It is not uncommon for clusters to intermingle, and that is the case in this artifact. A 
single sentence can contain four or more metaphors from different clusters. In such instances, the 
juxtaposition of metaphors from different clusters implies another layer of meaning. For 
instance, the NEAR/FAR metaphors and FORCE/WAR metaphors often intermingled with 
BODY, which creates visual imagery of two bodies who have come together to physically, 
literally lock in battle until one of the bodies is defeated. Co-mingling clusters build upon each 
other to strengthen overall framing of various aspects of the rhetorical claims.  
Archetypal metaphor may have enhanced President Bush's persuasiveness in this artifact. 
Archetypal metaphors, such as light/dark metaphors, “express intense value judgements and may 
thus be expected to elicit significant value responses from an audience" (Osborn, 1967). Bush’s 
light/dark metaphors similarly add weight and imperative. The LIGHT/DARK metaphorical 
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concept, with its supportive orientational metaphors light is up and dark is down, seem to 
intensely reinforce the GOOD/EVIL metaphorical concept by conjuring vivid imagery of 
America's bright values confronting the dark depths of terror itself. America and the enemy are 
described as literally being “light” or “dark” (Bush, 2001). Furthermore, the LIGHT/DARK 
metaphorical concept in particular may accentuate the stark two-sided worldview of prophetic 
dualism. As Osborn (1967) notes, “[Light/dark metaphors] perpetuate the simplistic, two-valued, 
black/white attitudes which rhetoricians and their audiences seem so often to prefer." Based on 
Osborn’s claims, one can conclude that these archetypal metaphors reinforce Bush’s overarching 
argument that the world can be – and perhaps should be – divided into two distinct camps. The 
archetypal metaphors may also help persuade audiences to take action.  
 This research lends support to Stuckey’s (1995) conclusion that an orientational 
metaphor is required for prophetic dualism to take hold among audiences. Stucky (1995) found 
that audiences did not accept George H. W. Bush's prophetic dualism narrative, constructed to 
lend support for the 1993 Persian Gulf War. This study finds several instances of orientational 
metaphor in President George W. Bush's September 20 address. The NEAR/FAR cluster 
spatially orients the United States to its enemy (it was far, now it is near), orients America to the 
civilized world (it is near, "rallying to our side"), and orients the enemy to the world (on the 
"fringe" of the world, far from the civilized world) (Bush, 2001). The LIGHT/DARK cluster 
contains supportive orientational metaphors portraying light as up and dark as down. In this 
spatial hierarchy, God is at the very top "watch[ing] over us," while the enemy is at the bottom. 
After America "track[s] down" the enemy, it will drop even lower into an "unmarked grave" 
(Bush, 2001). The orientational metaphors help the audience understand the narrative visually 
and also help the audience understand abstract notions of authority, strength and leadership 
spatially in terms of "up" and "down." These metaphors strengthen Bush's arguments and 
narrative by making them easier to understand. Audiences are enabled to independently fill gaps 
in the logic, concur with the narrative, and maintain their own portrait of the situation. 
Metaphor stands as a powerful rhetorical device. It is a seemingly innocent means of 
concocting new meaning, yet it is so pervasive that no meta-discussion can occur without 
employing metaphor; none of us has the power to avoid it. President Bush used metaphor 
repeatedly in his speech and the metaphor appears to be a critically persuasive aspect of the 
speech. The archetypal metaphors raised in his speech elevated the narrative to mythic levels, 
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and in turn, perhaps emotionally compelled audiences to support it. Bush successfully used both 
orientational metaphor and archetypal metaphor. 
Conclusion 
 The events of 9/11 created an immediate and salient crisis; it was a rhetorical situation 
that demanded response. A major attack on domestic soil, 9/11 left Americans confused and 
frightened, unsure of who issued the attacks, and if more attacks would occur. Americans 
(including American media) seem to have experienced nationwide trauma, stress, and fear for 
domestic safety. Patriotism and nationalism reached new heights; patriotism expressed through 
9/11 memorabilia sales and flag-waving; nationalism in the form of hate crimes and violence 
against Muslim Americans and in the vilification of private and public individuals who dissented 
against U.S.-led policy responses to 9/11, both foreign and domestic. President Bush needed to 
lead the country out of this crisis and toward a resolution. His September 20, 2001 address stands 
out as possibly the turning point in his rhetorical presidency. A holistic and detailed speech that 
answered a series of hypothetical questions, the speech was carefully planned with the 
president's involvement and was presented to a global audience. It was received with high regard 
in the press and the polls; his support reached as high as 91 percent in some polls (Cook, 2002a). 
Bush's response to the rhetorical situation was publicly successful, but the content of the speech - 
how it framed the situation, what it proposed, and the possible ensuing implications of such 
choices - forms the basis of this study. Scholars have noted that Bush used prophetic dualism 
later in his second administration, during the lead up to the Iraq War (Zagacki, 2007; Warner, 
2008). Prophetic dualism, a morals-based foreign policy worldview that creates a stark 
perspective of friend and foe that does not allow for neutrality or compromise, has significant 
consequences for nations that chose to follow it. This study posed three questions of the artifact: 
How, if at all, is civil religion present in President Bush's September 20, 2001 address? Is 
prophetic dualism evident in President George W. Bush's September 20, 2001 address? What, if 
any, metaphors did President Bush use to establish a framework of prophetic dualism? 
 Before beginning analysis of the artifact, this study explored scholarly work in the genres 
of presidential rhetoric, the modern rhetorical presidency, presidential crisis rhetoric, presidential 
war rhetoric, civil religion and prophetic dualism. Presidential rhetoric has the power to shape 
public values and define political reality. During times of crisis especially, the public looks to the 
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president for leadership and guidance. Presidents typically respond to crises by stating the facts 
of the situation, establishing a melodrama of good and evil, and recommending a course of 
action out of the crisis (Kuypers, 1997). But in times of war, presidents have greater rhetorical 
responsibility. Presidents are not constitutionally authorized to declare war on behalf of the 
nation, but they have repeatedly exercised the power to launch military actions without 
Congressional approval over the course of American history. In such cases, presidents typically 
will claim that the decision to go to war is a delicate, carefully made choice; they will establish a 
narrative of the situation; they call for unanimous support for war; they legitimize themselves as 
Commander-in-Chief; and they strategically misrepresent the situation in order to enhance their 
overall persuasiveness (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990). Presidents may use civil religion as part of 
their rhetoric; civil religious rhetoric is powerfully persuasive as it recalls religiously-derived 
morals that define a society's values, and recognizes those morals in the political realm. It is a 
lens to see the world through shared values and morals, and in 21st century, it has become an 
increasingly utilized tool in the rhetorical presidency (Kaylor, 2011). Typically, civil religion 
occurs when a speaker notes that there must exist a God; God's will is known and fulfilled 
through government; America is God's agent; and citizens should identify with God (Pierard & 
Linder, 1998). Prophetic dualism is a more narrow worldview that heavily pulls from civil 
religion in order to construct a morals-based foreign policy that portrays the enemy as "evil" and 
America as "good." Those who employ prophetic dualism claim God wills America to battle the 
enemy and claim that compromise and neutrality are equivalent to failure.  
 This study explored the possible extent of civil religion and prophetic dualism in 
President Bush's September 20, 2001 address through an examination of the speech's 
metaphorical concepts. To uncover metaphorical concepts, the analysis followed a process 
identified by Ivie (1987b) wherein the scholar identifies the metaphors, groups them into 
categories of similar vehicle meaning and entailments, and analyzes each group, or cluster, one 
by one. During analysis of each cluster, the rhetor will often go back to the original text to look 
for additional metaphors and the juxtaposition of metaphors from other clusters. This process 
results in nine clusters of metaphorical concepts: FORCE/WAR, BODY, FEAR, LIGHT/DARK, 
NEAR/FAR, UNITY, FAITH/FATE, GOOD/EVIL and SAVAGE. Combined together, the 
clusters paint a picture of 9/11 as an act of war waged by a dark fringe network of evildoers upon 
a peaceful and religious nation. God is invoked repeatedly as a righteous and willful figure who 
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supports America and who bestows victory - or defeat - depending on how much the nation relies 
on Him.  
This analysis leads to several rhetorical, political and methodological implications. In 
terms of rhetorical implications, this analysis seems to uphold most scholarly understandings of 
the modern rhetorical presidency, presidential crisis rhetoric, civil religion and prophetic 
dualism. The speech contains the tenets of civil religion and prophetic dualism, leading us to 
conclude that President Bush successfully enacted civil religion and prophetic dualism in this 
speech. Interestingly, this artifact contains all but one of the tenets of presidential war rhetoric. 
This missing aspect - that the rhetor carefully deliberated whether or not to go to war - could be 
absent for situational reasons (the audience craved a strong response to the rhetorical situation, 
and careful deliberation would not meet audience expectation), or arguably because a prophetic 
dualism worldview would necessarily reject careful deliberation.  Politically, the decision to use 
prophetic dualism leads to practical implications for the United States. Prophetic dualism can 
exacerbate nationalism because the president, speaking on behalf of the United States, asserts 
that the enemy is "evil" and sub-human. Such a perspective leaves little room for empathy, 
understanding or cultural respect, and Americans may perceive this as open room for individual 
hostility against people that they perceive to be the "enemy." Prophetic dualism also banishes 
neutrality and compromise as forms of failure. This can lead to negative consequences in the 
future. If neutrality were to later arise as the best course of action, presidents could have 
difficulty persuading the public to instead view neutrality as success. Lastly, prophetic dualism 
can be a "no win" foreign policy. If it frames the enemy as the embodiment of "evil," then by 
logical extension, victory means the either the eradication of the enemy, or the forcible change of 
the enemy's values. In the real world, neither of these approaches typically yields success. By 
using a prophetic dualism worldview, President Bush may have forced the United States into a 
permanent war on terror; a war without end. Methodologically, this study lends support to 
scholarly understanding of metaphor. It emerges in this artifact as a powerfully persuasive tool of 
speech. It emerged as a useful guidepost to underlying values, which under scrutiny, reveal 
implicit logical extensions of reasoning. In this artifact, archetypal metaphor was used to 
exaggerate the situation and imbue it with lofty American values and civil religion. This study 
also upholds Stuckey's (1995) argument that orientational metaphor may be necessary for 
prophetic dualism to succeed. President Bush's speech successfully used metaphor to build a 
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vivid physical world of good and evil, light and dark, savage and civil, which added a powerfully 
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